How do Chinese Scholars View Xi Jinping’s Visit to Europe and China’s EU strategy?
[Editor’s note: China’s President Xi Jinping recently wrapped up a three-country visit to Europe. We invited Thomas des Garets Geddes to share his observations on the Chinese analysts’ views of Xi’s visit and China’s EU strategy. Geddes is an associate fellow at RUSI and the editor of Sinification, a newsletter that curates, analyses and translates key articles and speeches by China’s establishment intellectuals, with a particular focus on the PRC’s international relations. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.]
Whereas in Europe, Xi’s visit was all about state subsidies, overcapacity, trade imbalances and Russia, the focus was elsewhere back in China.
For Chinese analysts, this trip was mainly about stabilizing EU-China ties, keeping European economies open to Chinese exports and investments, and encouraging French-led strategic autonomy (away from the U.S.).
Chinese scholars often depict the war in Ukraine as having changed the power dynamics within the EU in favor of the northern, central and eastern European “Atlantacists” (大西洋派 or 亲美国家) to the detriment of the more “pragmatic” French and Germans. The EU is now even more under the influence of the US, they argue.
Xi’s trip to France was about shoring up relations with a country that tends to be seen as the brains and political engine behind the EU’s quest for geopolitical power and strategic autonomy. A Europe more prone to competing with the PRC economically and politically certainly has its downsides for Beijing, but a more strategically autonomous European Union continues to be seen as key to mitigating Washington’s containment of China.
In fact, the “U.S. factor” is so present in Chinese discussions of the EU that Europe specialists in the PRC occasionally bemoan the lack of consideration paid to the EU-China relationship in and of itself.
Recent commentaries in China also show how popular Macron remains there despite his backing of a major irritant for Beijing: the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese-made electric vehicles. His ambiguous or en-même-temps approach towards Beijing, which includes giving China enough “face” at the same time as defending French and European interests, is generally understood, if not welcomed, by the country’s establishment intellectuals.
Beyond the issue of France, Chinese scholars describe Xi’s European trip as an important means of stabilizing ties with Europe in a year of global electoral uncertainty.
Beijing should prepare itself for a European Parliament that could lurch towards the far right and become even more “protectionist” and “unfriendly” towards China following the upcoming European elections in June, they argue.
Potential retaliations were mentioned. Were Brussels to increase its “protectionist measures” against China, Beijing should hit back say Jian Junbo (简军波) and Zhao Chen (赵晨), two relatively moderate scholars from Fudan University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) respectively. China’s state media have since hinted at this possibility too.
Chinese scholars see the uncertainty surrounding America’s presidential election and the prospect of a second Trump term as an opportunity for Beijing to cast itself as a reliable economic partner for EU member states. A second Trump presidency would undoubtedly be a huge challenge for Beijing, they believe, but one that may convince gloomy European economies that cooperation with China is the only way forward for them.
Whereas in the West, China’s courtship of Hungary on the one hand and Serbia on the other (and vice versa) is often depicted as being based on a desire to drive a wedge between European states, in China the two countries are described as providing “models” for the continent of how beneficial closer ties with China and participation in its Belt and Road Initiative can be. Hungary is, of course, also seen as an important voice within the EU that is “willing to speak up for China”. This is noteworthy as Hungary prepares to take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in July, commented one scholar.
In other words, China seems to want an EU that is united and strong enough to develop its strategic autonomy, but with just enough internal discord to disrupt anything that could be detrimental to its national interests.
Finally, Russia and Chinese overcapacity. Though little has been said about these two issues in the context of Xi’s European trip, some scholars point out that the West overestimates Beijing’s influence over Moscow. Looking at the broader discussion on Russia in recent months, there has been no suggestion that Beijing should change its policy towards Moscow, quite the contrary.
As for the issue of overcapacity, domestic debates and disagreements among Chinese scholars continue apace. Externally, however, it is often depicted as part of the West’s “cognitive warfare” (认知战) against Beijing and an attempt to stymie China’s economic rise.
The French have the expression “dialogue de sourds”, meaning a dialogue of the deaf. It continues to suit EU-China exchanges remarkably well.
