Unable or Unwilling? The Self-Imposed Limits of Chinese Conflict Mediation

Introduction

On March 10, 2023, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement surprised international analysts, not least because it was announced in Beijing. This diplomatic achievement prompted the Chinese government to tout the effectiveness of its approach to conflict mediation, extending offers to broker peace from Ukraine to Palestine. However, in the year since, Chinese “12-point plans,” special envoys and shuttle diplomacy have yet to contribute to ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. Meanwhile, any notion of a China-led “wave of reconciliation” sweeping across the Middle East has dissipated as the violence in Gaza threatens to escalate into regional war.

Many commentators have thus been quick to dismiss Chinese mediation’s effectiveness. However, this is missing the forest for the trees. Beijing’s conflict mediation strategy has, in reality, proven highly effective in achieving its primary objective: furthering Chinese interests at the lowest cost for Beijing. Amid the escalating China-U.S. competition, this means promoting China’s role, values, and vision of the international order, particularly in the Global South.

While achieving Chinese interests sometimes coincides with securing a lasting settlement (as stability is good for business), Beijing is often unwilling to invest the resources necessary to negotiate and enforce a peace deal, especially once it has sufficiently achieved its own goals. Indeed, the limits on Chinese mediation appear self-imposed, rather than stemming from China’s diplomatic capacity or its fundamental foreign policy principles.

The Origins of Chinese Conflict Mediation

Examining China’s track record, even the origins of its role in international mediation are rooted in self-interest.

In the 2000s, Beijing’s “Go Out” policy propelled Chinese businesses to expand globally. Enticed by abundant resources and the absence of foreign competitors, numerous state-owned enterprises set up shop in weak states and pariah regimes across Africa and the Middle East. As economic engagement flourished, the Chinese economy grew increasingly reliant on the energy resources and raw materials of these countries, prompting Beijing to take a greater interest in their stability.

A prime example is Sudan, home to extensive Chinese oil investments, which at their peak in 2002 supplied over 8% of China’s energy imports. When war erupted in Darfur in 2003, Beijing not only blocked UN resolutions aimed at halting Omar al-Bashir’s campaign of ethnic cleansing, but even continued to sell arms to Khartoum. However, as international outrage mounted, fueling calls for humanitarian intervention that could threaten Chinese oil infrastructure, Beijing began abstaining from UN Security Council resolutions aimed at de-escalating the conflict.

Nevertheless, China remained indifferent to brokering an end to the violence in Sudan until the specter of a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics spurred the People’s Republic to begin engaging in mediation as well. With assistance from China’s first Special Envoy for African Affairs Liu Guijin, Sudan eventually agreed to the deployment of a joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. Despite operating with Sudan’s consent, Beijing’s actions demonstrate that, when its interests are on the line, China has the capacity to wield its influence to pressure other states.

Although China remained involved in Sudan, particularly to safeguard its oil investments in newly independent South Sudan, Beijing appeared to step back from international conflict mediation until 2013. That year marked the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at promoting and formalizing a new wave of Chinese economic engagement, while projecting China as a rising and responsible global power. Given that Beijing’s renewed mediation efforts largely targeted South Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa—regions considered pivotal for the BRI’s connectivity goals—it is evident that China was interested in safeguarding its growing investments. The 2011 NATO-led military intervention in Libya likely catalyzed Beijing’s desire to play a more proactive diplomatic role, as the ensuing conflict not only paralyzed lucrative Chinese oil investments but also left tens of thousands of Chinese nationals stranded amid the unfolding civil war. This war shaped China’s approach to mediation during the BRI’s initial years to prevent similar interventions from imperiling Chinese interests and nationals, as well as China-friendly regimes, Beijing barged its way into conflict mediation processes across the world.

Beyond ensuring that China’s position and interests were evident to all parties involved, this proactive diplomatic engagement had the added benefit of allowing Beijing to present itself as a reliable and responsible global stakeholder, particularly in contrast to the Trump administration. This newfound interest in promoting its global image and influence may explain why China intervened in high-profile crises where it had limited direct economic concerns, such as the Syrian Civil War and the Rohingya refugee crisis.

However, this period of Chinese mediation has also been characterized as largely ineffective. China’s one-size-fits-all approach, consisting of participating in high-level meetings with government officials, failed to yield any sustainable peace settlement.

This lackluster performance can mostly be attributed to Beijing’s tendency to exclude relevant non-state actors from peace processes. While China justifies this approach with the principle of “respect for state sovereignty,” a more plausible reason is that dealing with non-state actors is time and resource-intensive. Additionally, engaging solely with other governments is mostly sufficient to achieve China’s objectives of safeguarding its interests and enhancing its global standing, as only states can launch major military interventions, implement sanctions, and vote at the UN.

Nevertheless, this approach led to sidelined rebel and terrorist groups continuing to target Chinese projects and citizens in unstable areas like the Central African Republic and Balochistan. Furthermore, while Chinese mediation did help ensure the survival of pro-China authoritarian regimes in Syria and Myanmar, it did not significantly increase Beijing’s global standing. Indeed, although China did become increasingly recognized as an economic partner, its mediation track record failed to establish it as a credible political and security actor.

A “New Era” of Chinese Conflict Mediation?

Toward the latter part of the 2010s, China’s approach to conflict mediation underwent a noticeable shift due to three key factors. Firstly, as early as 2017, Chinese infrastructure financing under the umbrella of the BRI began to dwindle. What remained of Chinese financing steered clear of unstable and weak states due to mounting concerns over the risk of debt distress. Furthermore, with the decreasing number of Chinese workers overseas and Beijing prioritizing “small and beautiful” projects, safeguarding investments and nationals became a less pertinent issue for Chinese diplomacy.

Secondly, the rivalry between the U.S. and China intensified. Following Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, Washington recommitted to multilateral diplomacy and embarked on an effort to mobilize democracies, like-minded nations, and regional allies against Beijing. This prompted China to intensify its own diplomatic endeavors, with its rhetoric increasingly aimed at defaming the U.S.

Finally, the Chinese government became more open about its vision to reshape the international order, affirm itself as a premier world power, and create a “community of shared future.” To achieve this, China has begun establishing a growing number of new initiatives for promoting its values and norms around the world (e.g., Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative) and supporting the expansion of China-led regional organizations like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Against this backdrop, China’s motivation for engaging in conflict mediation remains self-interest, though its main interest appears to have become undermining the U.S. while championing its worldview and global leadership. This is evident in China’s departure from prioritizing participation in established, predominantly Western-led international platforms. Instead, Beijing now favors establishing its own conferences, where it can assert itself without opposition.

A noteworthy example is the first Horn of Africa Peace, Good Governance and Development Conference, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 2022.

Safeguarding Chinese economic interests was not a significant factor behind this high-profile China-organized event. When war erupted between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal government in November 2020, China’s initial response was not attempting to broker peace, but rather establishing a “security safeguarding mechanism” with Ethiopia to protect its investments. When Beijing began to engage in mediation efforts in early 2022, Chinese economic interests were secure, as the fighting had already died down.

Despite China’s considerable influence in the region—being a major economic and development partner for all the Horn’s states and having its only official overseas military base in Djibouti—brokering peace also did not seem to be a priority. Unlike Special Envoy Liu Guijin, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Xue Bing was not a seasoned diplomat with substantial African experience. His nomination likely reflects China’s reluctance to allocate sufficient resources to resolving the many border and security issues in the region. Even Xue himself stated that his discussions with African leaders “did not touch upon the mediation efforts and nobody raised this issue.”

Thus, while this conference did little to ease tensions in the Horn, where the specter of war looms as Ethiopia threatens to use force to secure access to the sea, it was effective in achieving Beijing’s primary goal: establishing a new China-led international forum in this strategic region for countering U.S. influence. Through this platform, Beijing managed to legitimize the China-friendly Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, despite the U.S. imposing sanctions on his government for engaging in a “pattern of gross violations of human rights.” Additionally, the high-visibility nature of this event showcased Beijing’s commitment to Global South countries being “masters of their own destiny.”

Unsuccessful or Successful, but Always Half-hearted

In February 2022, Beijing issued its 12-point position paper on reaching a “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis.” Widely misconstrued as a peace plan, the document more aptly resembles a shopping list of principles and talking points, lacking a clear framework or concrete steps to resolve hostilities. Notably, it does not bind China to any commitments, demonstrating Beijing’s hesitance to involve itself in the conflict or assume the responsibility of brokering peace between the two sides.

Similarly to the Horn of Africa Peace Conference, the main objective of this position paper was to present China as a responsible power. Specifically, Beijing sought to mend its relations with European countries, avoid alienating Russia, and show Global South states its commitment to resolving a war that is causing them significant economic hardship.

Although the position paper faced criticism from Europeans, who interpreted Beijing’s failure to condemn Moscow or take tangible measures to hinder Russian aggression as “pro-Russian neutrality” and disregard for European security concerns, it garnered support across the Global South, which appreciated its condemnation of unilateral sanctions and “Cold War mentality.” Thus, despite Beijing not actively contributing to mediation efforts, the paper helped China achieve most of its goals, albeit failing to help bring peace to Ukraine.

Conversely, Chinese mediation was successful in ending the seven-year standoff between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. This reconciliation in a historically U.S.-dominated region significantly enhanced Beijing’s global prestige. It also fostered stability in a region crucial for Chinese energy imports, while cementing the expansion of BRICS in the Middle East, reinforcing Chinese influence.

However, this diplomatic triumph cannot be solely credited to Chinese mediation. Similarly to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Beijing did not exert much effort to broker peace. Analysts and journalists have noted that Tehran and Riyadh had shown a willingness to set aside their rivalry for the sake of regional stability and economic development for quite some time. Moreover, Oman and Iraq played more prominent roles during the initial, more critical phase of mediation. China’s involvement only came in the final stages, likely at the behest of both parties, to offer additional assurance from outside the Middle East.

This trend of limited effort also extends to China’s response to the ongoing war in Gaza. Despite presenting several “X-point plans” to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 2002, maintaining cordial relations with both sides, and delivering strong rhetoric at the UN, Beijing has yet to take any tangible actions to halt the bloodshed, secure the release of Israeli hostages, or prevent a regional escalation. Instead, to bolster its influence in the Muslim and Arab world vis-à-vis the U.S., China has adopted a position described as “pro-Palestinian neutrality,” which includes not condemning or even naming Hamas.

An often-cited reason for China’s passive approach to conflict mediation is its alleged adherence to its core foreign policy principles, particularly the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” which some argue limit its effectiveness as a mediator. However, as evidenced by its response to Darfur and Ukraine, China is willing to disregard principles like non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity when its own interests are in play. Moreover, Beijing has no qualms about leveraging its economic influence to compel actors to alter their policies, as demonstrated by its past imposition of punitive trade measures against Lithuania and Australia. In Myanmar, China even overcame its distaste for engaging with non-state actors when, in order to secure its border, it facilitated a (short-lived) ceasefire between the ruling military junta and a coalition of armed rebel groups.

Nevertheless, when China lacks vested interests, it exhibits minimal willingness to participate in mediation efforts. A stark illustration is its disinterest in the ongoing civil war and humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan. This significant reversal from its stance just fifteen years ago is due to the collapse of Chinese economic engagement after the independence of South Sudan, which resulted in Sudan losing most of its oil reserves.

Implications and Conclusion

In summary, Chinese conflict mediation efforts now appear less driven by economic interests—likely due to China’s growing economic self-sufficiency and diversification—and more by its interest to bolster its global standing vis-à-vis the U.S. While Chinese mediation can yield positive results, Beijing is reluctant to shoulder the costs required for securing a lasting resolution. As a result, China tends to favor flashy, superficial, cost-effective mediation efforts that elevate its role, narratives, and values in the Global South, without committing to more substantive efforts that could genuinely resolve conflicts.

Despite this, China’s approach to conflict mediation has undeniably contributed to promoting its image across the Global South. Recent polls in the Middle East and Southeast Asia show a notable shift in public opinion favoring China over the U.S. Given the adage “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” is therefore probable that Beijing will maintain its mediation strategy, especially concerning the Russo-Ukrainian War and the conflict in Gaza.

While one can hope that Beijing might reassess its stance, other states could ensure that China’s interests align with more active engagement in conflict mediation. History shows that when faced with significant international pressure, China has acted against its immediate interests to uphold its global standing. For instance, threats of boycotts against the 2008 Beijing Olympics compelled China to pressure Sudan, while a unified stance from Arab, African, and Muslim states led Beijing to abstain from the UN Security Council resolution allowing the NATO-led military intervention against Libya.

Finally, if the U.S. intends to counteract how Chinese mediation strengthens Beijing’s influence across the Global South, it must present a compelling alternative. The appeal of Chinese mediation lies in its purported potential for economic and development cooperation and its critique of Western hypocrisy. Hence, Washington’s mediation efforts should not only strive to be more effective but should also offer tangible trade and investment opportunities while avoiding double standards.