After Engagement w/ Orville Schell

Edison Chen: Dr. Schell, you serve as the director of the Asia Society’s Center on China US Relations in March. Your Task Force on U.S.- China policy, an almost decade old group of some of America’s most experienced China specialists, recently published a new memo. Can you talk about why you started the task force and who are the personnel on your team?

Orville Schell: Well, this was funded by the Carnegie Corporation, almost ten years ago. Our feeling was that administrations come and go, and universities are a dish of loose sand. It would be good to mobilize all the people who care about the real world, which is distinguished from the academic world. We wanted people from think tanks, media, and diplomacy to come together to make policy recommendations, do events, and advise both the American government and other governments. We have 20 odd people and they’ve gotten to be very close friends and colleagues. The object was to build a collegium of China people that transcended any single institution, whether it’s a think tank, university, the government, or a business. We have people from all those different categories.

EC: In the Task Force “Memo on U.S. Policy to China,” you called for a laddered approach to negotiations with China instead of a grand bargain. Could you describe the logic behind your recommendation, and what steps the United States needs to take to achieve its desired results?

OS: We recognized that with Donald Trump coming back into the government, the country is heading into a very unpredictable and possibly even rough period of time. So our sense was that the relationship had been degrading and becoming more adversarial. We did want to keep the doors open to discuss the issues that divided the two countries. We also wanted to recognize that there were many impediments that stood in the way between the two countries to achieve any transformative solution. That was sort of our notion of a laddered approach. Be ready to climb the ladder, and to go step by step.

EC: So, your concerns were with the possibility of the Trump administration attempting a grand bargain?

OS: The United States is now in a terra incognita, with a president who is extremely unpredictable. I think he has a notion that he alone as a kind of a business titan is capable of making a deal that’ll transform the relationship, the way mafia bosses or capos do it. I’m not sure it’s that simple. Trump imagines that his powers of negotiation can bring Xi Jinping around, bro-to-bro, to work this out. My own experience is that working anything out with the Chinese is a laborious process. Why? Because there are deep and abiding conflictual issues that separate us, not only political systems, but other forms of interest, whether it’s territory, geography, or military technology. So I think my own sense is that we yearn for that Kissinger-Nixon and Zhou Enlai-Mao grand bargain, but at this point in history it’s not very realistic.

Back in 1971-72, when Nixon and Kissinger started talking with Zhou Enlai, they both feared the Soviet Union. That was a binding agent. We disagreed on many things, but we were both fearful of the Soviet Union, which, at that point, was more powerful than China. After Gorbachev dissolved the Soviet Union, we lost the reason why we overlooked our political differences and joined this grand bargain. Soon, President Clinton, started the term ‘engagement relationship’: we have common interest in a global trade union and that if we trade together, slowly, China will probably become less antagonistic to the United States.

The new principle didn’t work out. Engagement is dead. Was it wrong? I don’t believe so. I think it was a good try. I think Americans should be credited with their diplomacy to peacefully transform the relationship, but the very notion of engagement that China would slowly become more congenial, and less antagonistic was also threatening to the Communist Party. Now we are without an operating system with two very different political systems. Of course, America now has our own ogre in Trump. We’ll see how that works out.

EC: In the memo, you mentioned that China is unlikely to alter its trajectory on military modernization. When the United States, a current rival of China, has the world’s largest army by a wide margin, is there any incentive for China to slow down its military expansion?

OS: I think the problem about escalating military on both sides of the divide is that it’s unlikely that process is going to be slowed down anytime soon. It’s because the Chinese Communist Party at this point in history views the United States as a fundamentally hostile foreign force in the Chinese word, and has never abandoned that. This is sort of the Maoist way. You remember Mao had very highly evolved notions of what contradictions were. He said there were two kinds. One kind of contradiction was among the people, and could be solved by discussion and negotiation. The other kind of contradiction he called an antagonistic contradiction, and those could only be solved through struggle, hostility, and possibly even violence, such as we saw in the Cultural Revolution, which was a class warfare.

I’m afraid this is why the notion of engagement, which nine American presidential administrations tried very hard to make work, came to an end. Because the fundamentally hostile sense of the relationship between the two countries was very difficult to dissolve. This is simply to say that behind the military escalation, the tendency on both sides to escalate their military strengths, is this deep suspicion that the other side poses a fundamental risk, whether it’s to the political system or territory, you name it. So I don’t foresee us having either a grand bargain, or see the United States or China saying: well, let’s have a peace dividend and stop investing in the military.

EC: The memo recommended that America counter China in its territories of Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. While it may be legitimate from the perspective from some to protect American interest in Taiwan, do you think the United States have a legitimate reason to get involved in the regions located in China’s mainland?

OS: First of all, one should point out that areas like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia were not always a part of China. Dynasties came and went. The Qing dynasty had strange relationship with Tibet. It was an affiliated part of China, but was quite independent in many ways and particularly during the early 20th century. So, it depends on which China you choose: Ming Dynasty China, which was just central China, or Qing Dynasty China, which was Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Of course, they claimed Taiwan and Hong Kong as well. Both the nationalists and the communists chose the Qing model, the empire. This creates a dilemma. The United States and the West doesn’t challenge that notion. The bigger China can be China, but here’s where we get into the problem. If you do believe in universal human rights, which most Western countries do, then you get into the idea that in a certain sense, if people’s rights are violated anywhere in the world, it’s everybody’s concern that we are our brother’s keeper, to put it in Christian terms. This creates a problem where sovereignty or no sovereignty doesn’t matter. Whether you think China should be Qing China or Ming China, what happens to Chinese is of some concern to people elsewhere in the world because we’re all human beings and we don’t like to see people suffer, live under tyranny, and have their rights violated. Is that right or is that wrong? Everybody has to make their own decision on that.

EC: In early 2020, before the outbreak of COVID-19, Trump said that he does not want to engage in the Xinjiang issue because he is more interest in resolving the trade conflict with China. Do you see that as a legitimate strategy?

OS: I understand we need a trade relationship, but the trouble is that the trade relationship sits in the middle of the political and the geopolitical relationship. You might think you can just negotiate a trade agreement separate from all the relationships, but it’s impossible because these other issues keep interfering. How can you have a trade relationship with China when China claims Taiwan, all of the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, a big piece of India. Those are our [India] natural Pradesh, but the Chinese claim it as part of Tibet. Thus, there are all these other issues which just get in the way of having a simple agreement on trade, culture, or COVID policy. This is why we’re having such a difficult time and don’t know where we can find some common ground. Because all common grounds are dependent on the political contradiction that exists between the two societies, the way they view their people, the way they view law, and the way they view everything, we are in a grave historical period where there’s very few points of common interest that can be identified.

EC: In the memo, you also touched on the recent tensions in the cancellation of Chinese student visa. You said that the U.S. government should protect its national security without losing the flow of talent. Is it possible to sanction people while trying to attract more talent into the country?

OS: I think it’s very difficult, but essential for the United States. We are an open society, at least before Trump arrived. We keep the doors open to welcome immigrants, who have always been the strength of America. They formed such an important part of our intellectual vigor, and strength of our universities and society in general. That said, I also recognize that China is increasingly putting resources into its united front strategy. It used to be that China wanted to control what was said within China. Lately, they also want to control what is said about China outside of China, and that means they want to control the united front activities, and all spying activities that do go on.

I suppose this does make people feel that there’s a risk coming from another country, but this means that there’s a deep contradiction at the heart of welcoming immigrants from a country like China, when it’s stealing intellectual property to beef up its own technological capacities. It’s a very difficult situation to deal with in a friendly and constructive way that makes Chinese students feel welcomed and want to be a part of America. Or, if they go back to China, then America starts wondering why we are training people to fortify our enemy? The dilemma is not an easy one to solve. The FBI has not done a great job doing that. There are a lot of abuses, and I think it’s very painful to watch. On the other hand, there is a real threat, so I don’t know the answer to it.

It used to be that the exchanges that went on in the sciences, no matter if it was STEM sciences or chip technology, were considered very constructive forms of bridge building. The relationship became more hostile under President Xi, and there was a threat from China as perceived by the United States in the areas we’ve mentioned: Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the conflicts in the South China Sea against the Philippines, the Japanese and the Senkaku Islands. Yes, it throws the notion of free and open exchange. We don’t care about British coming to school because we are pretty sure we’re not going to go to war with Britain, but there is a real possibility the United States could be at some kind of conflicts with China. That’s the dilemma, and it’s not an easy one to answer.

EC: Shifting gears, in 1971, only three years before you first visited China in 1974, the United Nations voted to expel the Republic of China, the Taiwan regime, and one year later, President Nixon visited mainland China. How did the major shifts in U.S.-China relations happen within such a short time?

OS: This was mostly due to President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coming on board. Kissinger wrote an article saying that the United States could not ignore a country as large and consequential as China. I think he was largely right about that. He wanted to find some ways to diminish the dangers of the Cold War. The Soviet Union as a common enemy provided that common concern, which allowed the United States and China to come together in 1972. This was not engagement, but instead, a treaty of transactional utility. China had a 4,000-mile border with the Soviet Union. We were concerned about a possible war, and thought China can be on our side. That’s good news, but then in 1979, Taiwan lost diplomatic recognition when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China.

For the United States, having a relationship with China and making it less dangerous and threatening was probably smart, but it buried the fundamental differences between the two systems. When China finally gained wealth and power, it wanted to play a greater role in the world stage. It wanted to reclaim all the pieces of its old empire, including Tibet, pieces of India, Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands. Next, I think they’re going to want to reclaim some areas in Siberia that were given away in the 18th century. This creates lots of points of tension that are very difficult to deal with. I understand China’s claim on Taiwan, but if Quebec can vote again and again whether to leave the federal Republic of Canada, if Czechoslovakia decided to divide into two countries, and if Scotland keeps voting on whether it wants to leave the United Kingdom, and the prime principle of the United Nations should be self-determination, then one does wonder, should China not allow Taiwan to decide whether it wants to be part of China or not?

Remember that Mao said to Kissinger and Nixon that it’s okay if Taiwan isn’t decided for a hundred years. When Deng Xiaoping went to meet Jimmy Carter in 1979, he stopped in Japan and said to leave Taiwan to smarter future generations to solve. Not a bad idea, but now we’re at a point where Xi Jinping says they’re going to take Taiwan and the military should be ready to take Taiwan by 2027. This ups the threat.

After Nixon and Kissinger made their agreement with Mao and Zhou Enlai, the U.S. Congress did pass the Taiwan Relations Act saying that we should provide sufficient military assistance to Taiwan to defend itself and let it make its own mind up. Taiwan can say we want to join the mainland, which I believe at some point in history it will, but China has to become a little bit more democratic for Taiwan to be comfortable to do that. This is a real question countries have to wrestle with. Do you defend your allies, partners, and friends, or do you just say, “not our business”. This is a key issue in foreign relations since the beginning of time.

EC: You argued in your Project Syndicate article that the Europeans needs to fill the vacancy left by American isolationism so that China does not get that spot. In your opinion, who is in a better position to take the lead in the world economy? Is it Europe or America under Trump?

OS: I think the Trump administration is something that is out of the stream of other presidents. He’s so unprincipled and hard to understand. Now America is in a state of deep disarray, uncertainty, and even chaos. Trump just wanted to do what he wanted to do, and he did it. And if people didn’t agree with him, he’d lock them up. What does that mean for relations with China? It’s very hard to say. I think Xi Jinping is a little bit uncertain about what the best pathway forward is with someone like Donald Trump. To his credit, he’s been rather cautious, but this story is not over yet. Will it end? I have my doubts.

With America under Trump being unpredictable, the Europeans are like children who discover that their parents have left the house and they cannot turn to parents for guidance or for discipline. For example, you see Germany now trying to find a way for the Europeans to have adequate military resources to protect themselves should Russia start taking other countries. In Asia, Korea, Japan, the Philippines are confused. Thus, we are in an inflection point in history if the US has really abdicated leadership. If countries that are democratic in nature do not want to see China increase its footprint around the world politically, they’re going to have to take leadership themselves. Will they? Can they? I don’t know, but they’re going to need to try. It’s important for Europe, Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia to have greater solidarity and learn how to lead themselves. When the Roman Empire fell, world history changed. Nazi Germany fell, and Hideki Tojo in Japan also fell. Maybe it’s the United States’ turn to crumble and someone else may have to take up the leadership responsibility.

EC: The other main player in this relationship is China. What advantages and disadvantages does China have in its attempt to take the lead in world trade during the Trump administration?

OS: I think China obviously has a lot of advantages. It’s been very successful and we have to recognize that success. It’s to the credit of the Chinese people. Each side, the United States and China, has some choke points on the other. The United States controls microchip technology, which is absolutely critical. It controls the dollar denominated currency as the global currency, markets, and finance. It has a choke point there. On the other side, China also has a lot of very considerable choke points like rare earth, EV technology, wind power, polys, and silicon solar technology. 90% of the world’s solar technologies come from China. Chinese manufacturers like BYD have very advanced electronic vehicles. Therefore, each side has strengths that they can lever and use punitively against the other in a global market system. That said, you don’t want to be retaliatory and punitive. You want to be cooperative. Of course, it’s very hard to cooperate in a system of global trade if you feel politically threatened by the very person you’re cooperating with. That’s the dilemma we’re in now.

EC: Finally, why has President Trump always treated China as a competitor dating back to his 2016 campaign? And is the president officially treating China as a hostile force for the foreseeable future?

OS: I think Donald Trump has no consistency whatsoever. How he views China is completely transactional: Can I make the appearance of having a deal? He’s like some hotel magnate who has competition from another hotel company in that he just wants to win. That’s Donald Trump, but he doesn’t represent the interests of the United States and many Americans. I think it’s going to be very hard to work out a global trade agreement with China when there are fundamentally so many China hawks in the Trump administration. There were hawks in the Biden administration as well. These people, who had spent years dealing with China, decided things have changed there. It leaves us in a critical tipping point in history, led by two leaders who are deeply lacking in the ability to make the kind of compromises that someone like Nixon and Kissinger actually did. I hope with all my heart and soul that war is not our fate.