Hu Xijin: Is a Xi’an Incident–style military coup possible in Taiwan?
Editor’s Note: This commentary was written by Hu Xijin, a well-known Chinese opinion influence and former editor-in-chief of Global Times. It was originally published on Phoenix Net on July 31, 2025. In the article, Hu refers to a “bold idea” proposed by Gao Zhikai in an interview earlier that month—namely, achieving national unification with Taiwan through a coup akin to the 1936 Xi’an Incident. Gao is Vice President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), a Beijing-based think tank, and a prominent political commentator in China.
While Hu calls this idea naïve and highly improbable, a close reading of his article suggests that he does not entirely rule it out. As he writes, “We need to create a much greater strategic advantage and redundancy in deterrent power, using immense strategic confidence to support a decisive showdown at a key moment, and to give strong momentum to any sudden turn of events that would allow unification at minimal cost.”
A “Xi’an Incident”–style scenario is presumably one such possible “sudden turn.” Another key argument Hu makes is that resolving the Taiwan issue at minimal cost requires the Chinese mainland to exhaust all means to force the U.S. to back down. Views like this may only reinforce U.S. policymakers’ determination not to compromise on Taiwan.
For additional context, we include a July 13 report by Taiwan’s Central News Agency on Gao Zhikai’s original remarks. After the Chinese version of this article and the above Editor’s Note were published, Zichen Wang, founder of Pekingnology, an English-language newsletter, strongly objected to the editorial interpretation of Hu Xijin’s article. Below is Wang’s analysis, published here with his permission, for readers’ reference:
I believe the editorial note fundamentally misinterprets Hu Xijin’s comments. In China’s public discourse, when Hu makes a statement like this—although phrased with great politeness and restraint—it is, in fact, a public rejection (and rejection itself is a form of criticism) of Gao Zhikai’s proposal.
The sentence quoted in the editorial note, in the structure of Hu’s original article, clearly comes after he has already dismissed Gao’s proposal. It is a parallel and separate argument, not a comment on Gao’s idea, but the beginning of a new section.
Furthermore, the final sentence in Hu’s piece reveals his true intent: “When that day comes, let us follow the central government’s decision. Let us not be impatient or impetuous, but stay united as one.” In plain terms: Gao Zhikai is being too hasty. Commentators like him should stop offering random policy recommendations. Everyone needs to cease meddling—just follow the leadership.
In essence, this is a wholesale rejection of grassroots calls for accelerating unification. Hu Xijin is trying to pour cold water on overheated public discourse and cool things down—but he can’t say it outright. In my view, the editorial note’s reading of Hu’s article is completely off the mark.
From May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army organized forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force to conduct the “Joint Sword–2024A” exercise around the Taiwan Island. (Image source: PLA Eastern Theater Command)
The following is the complete translation of Hu’s commentary (bold are inserted by the editor).
Many scholars and independent commentators have put forward ideas on how to achieve unification with Taiwan. Recently, someone proposed a bold idea: if figures similar to Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng were to emerge in Taiwan and stage a “Xi’an Incident,” seizing control of William Lai and the authorities in Taipei, and then inviting the mainland to send in forces to take over the situation, that would be ideal.
This is indeed a beautiful wish. But I, Old Hu, must speak objectively: under current conditions, the likelihood of such an event is almost nonexistent. To attempt to engineer such a scenario would be a waste of effort with little hope of success.
First of all, the political environment in Taiwan today is vastly different from that of 1936 when the Xi’an Incident occurred. Back then, China faced the grave threat of Japanese expansion. Zhang Xueliang’s Northeast Army had retreated into China proper and was widely condemned across the country, while Yang Hucheng’s Northwest Army faced intense public pressure to join in resisting Japan. Chiang Kai-shek had gone to Xi’an to pressure Zhang and Yang to suppress the Communists. But since both men commanded large armies loyal first and foremost to themselves, not to the Nationalist government, and amid high public calls for united resistance, Chiang’s pressure ultimately backfired, pushing Zhang and Yang into action.
In today’s Taiwan, the military lacks political independence. Senior officers are career professionals deeply embedded within Taiwan’s legal and political system. It’s extremely difficult for them to generate any kind of independent, subversive political momentum. For them to make a decision on the level of a “military coup,” it would take a crisis of the highest magnitude—perhaps the outbreak or imminent outbreak of a cross-Strait war—prompting them to rise up either for self-preservation or in the name of Chinese national unity, similar to Zhang and Yang’s actions in 1936.
Overall, achieving unification with Taiwan is a monumental project that the mainland must accomplish through fundamental efforts. Pinning hopes on an internal coup in Taiwan like the Xi’an Incident is sheer romanticism. Unification won’t be easy or come without cost. This generation of Chinese people must prepare for a more concrete struggle and resolutely see national reunification through to completion.
Ultimately, solving the Taiwan issue is about managing the China–U.S. relationship. To achieve unification, China must steadily gain advantages in key areas of strategic competition with the United States.
The first of these is military dominance in the Taiwan Strait. This is already becoming a reality. But Washington still refuses to accept it and clings to illusions that the U.S. military could stop the mainland from retaking Taiwan by force. China needs to continue building overwhelming military superiority and deterrence in the region, so that the U.S. is completely dissuaded from any attempt at military intervention.
After launching a full-scale trade war this year, the Trump administration has also shown enthusiasm for reaching agreements with China. The European Union has talked about “de-risking” from China for years, but they’ve done little in practice. This all shows that China is no longer a country that the U.S. or the West can sanction at will. This trend must be strengthened and expanded.
In my view, the “liberation of Taiwan” has already begun. Over the past few years, our overwhelming military advantage over Taiwan, our deterrence capability against the U.S., and our growing resilience against potential Western sanctions are all steadily advancing—and these strengths are mutually reinforcing. But even so, we cannot count on internal actors in Taiwan to do the job that must ultimately be ours to finish. We need to create much greater strategic advantage and redundancy in deterrent power, and with immense confidence be ready to take decisive action at the right moment, giving strong momentum to sudden events that may allow unification at minimal cost.
I often hear people say that Taiwan’s military might collapse at the first shot and that unification could be achieved overnight. I, too, think that once war breaks out, a complete collapse of the Taiwanese military could happen in a matter of hours—24, 48, or 72. But it should not be the required objective for initiating military action, nor should it become the decisive condition for defining success. Our strategic redundancy must ensure that if war breaks out, faster is better, but dragging it out for one or two weeks—or even one or two months—should also be acceptable, with no major problems. If the U.S. doesn’t intervene, great. If it does, we must be able to deal with it confidently and effectively. Creating condition after condition for this kind of confidence—while fostering shared assessments internationally—is what the unification process must look like.
Taiwan is right next door. The world knows the Chinese people are determined to unify. International law is on our side. Our strength is growing. Our strategic redundancy is building. Taiwan is already within the sphere of unification; it is firmly caught within the mainland’s field of power. Let us remain patient. Time will complete the formal unification ceremony. When will that take place? Let us just follow the state’s decision. Let us be calm, united, and determined.
The following report was published by Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CAN).
Chinese scholar calls for second “Xi’an Incident” to unify Taiwan; Taiwanese experts warn of military unification tactics
(CNA Reporter Lü Jiarong, Taipei, July 13)
A Chinese commentator known for appearances in international media recently said he hopes for a “second Xi’an Incident” to achieve unification with Taiwan. Though the idea has been criticized as sheer fantasy, Taiwanese scholars warn that it reflects a shift toward militarized unification strategies, requiring heightened vigilance.
In a widely circulated online interview on July 4 with the left-leaning Chinese outlet Guancha.cn, Gao Zhikai, Vice President of the Center for China and Globalization, said Beijing faces the twin problems of dim prospects for peaceful unification and the high cost of military action. Therefore, he expressed hope that unification with Taiwan might be resolved by a “second Xi’an Incident.”
The Xi’an Incident occurred on December 12, 1936, during the Chinese Civil War. Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng detained Chiang Kai-shek and demanded he stop the civil war and resist Japan instead. The incident allowed the Chinese Communists to regroup.
In the interview, Gao said it’s possible that someone in Taiwan could “suddenly, for example, control [President] Lai Ching-te,” and then issue a series of public statements—including calls for the mainland to send “security forces” to restore order. He described these mainland forces as “dressed like security personnel,” saying this would not constitute an act of war, but rather “a security operation” at the invitation of local authorities, accompanied by a directive barring Taiwan’s police and military from firing on them.
This is not the first time Gao has proposed a “second Xi’an Incident.” Wang Zhisheng, assistant professor at Central Police University in Taiwan, said the comment highlights the variety of coercive methods China may use to annex Taiwan—not just war or peaceful unification, but everything in between.
Wang told CNA that Gao’s proposal verges on “military annexation,” and that there are precedents internationally for coups or proxy agents being used to topple governments. He added that this kind of rhetoric should alert Taiwan to the risk posed by fifth-column forces acting as Beijing’s agents from within.
Wang noted that there has been little serious discussion in Taiwan about countering such internal threats. Gao’s far-fetched comments provide an opportunity to examine how close Beijing may be to using military options, and Taiwan must take precautions.
Wu Sih-chih, a consulting member at the Taiwan Thinktank, told CNA that Gao’s remarks reveal a lack of understanding of both Taiwan and cross-Strait dynamics. He said Gao is clearly not an expert in this field.
Wu noted that Gao realizes unification by force would be enormously costly, not only due to China’s own constraints but also because of strong opposition from the U.S. and neighboring countries. Meanwhile, peaceful unification is equally difficult due to the vast differences in each other’s political systems across the Strait. Taiwan’s democratic development makes it virtually impossible to govern the island through authoritarian means.
Gao, a fluent English speaker and former interpreter for Deng Xiaoping, has made many attention-grabbing remarks to foreign media outlets, including claims that Chinese troops used microwave weapons during border conflicts with India.
