Assessing Peaceful Unification w/ Xin Qiang

A “Battle Copper Print” from 1787 depicting the Qianlong Emperor’s campaign against Taiwan. Source

Xin Qiang (信强) is the inaugural director of the Center for Taiwan Studies, and the deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. Professor Xin is the author and interpreter of many reports and books on the issue of Taiwan. Professor Xin was a visiting scholar at American University, and during his studies served as a legislative intern for then-congressman Jim McDermott. In 2013, Professor Xin received the “New Century Talent” by China’s Ministry of Education for his academic excellence and leadership.

In this interview, we cover the role the U.S. Congress plays in America’s Taiwan policies. We discuss the educational and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, and the political movements that led to the rise of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the pro-independence sentiment on the island. We also touch on Beijing’s attitude towards the Taiwan issue. Professor Xin states that Congress offers checks and balances to the White House’s China policies, and lauds the people-to-people exchanges as a valuable experience for young people from both sides. He attributes the DPP’s de-sinicization efforts as driven by the party’s political interests. Xin argues that mainland China has always prioritized peaceful reunification of Taiwan over military intervention, and that Beijing will be flexible in the Taiwan integration process if the DPP accepts that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it.
Pledge your support

Edison Chen: Professor Xin, you published a book called “Interpreting US Taiwan Policymaking: Perspective of Congress” in 2010. While many scholars approach the Taiwan issue from a macro level, your book zoomed in on the role of the U.S. Congress in America’s Taiwan policies. What unique role does Congress play in shaping America’s Taiwan policies?

Xin Qiang: To start, within the framework of the checks and balances system of the American political architecture, the Congress, the legislative branch, can play a multidimensional role concerning America’s Taiwan policymaking. First, it plays a supportive role because if the President wants to do something, and can get support from Congress, the executive branch’s implementation of those policies can be facilitated. For example, providing the necessary funding and having critical consensus in supporting the White House will make it easier for the President to implement certain policies. I think Congress plays a supporting role because the President plays a very unique and dominant role but still needs support from Congress. Secondly, Congress can also play a leading role on the Taiwan issue.

When the President wants to do something, Congress may follow, but when Congress thinks the President hasn’t done enough, for example, to support authorities in Taiwan, Congress might take the driver’s seat and pass some laws to compel the White House to follow Congress’s lead. For example, the Taiwan Relations Act was passed when the White House did not do a lot. Now it’s being regarded as the most important part of the so-called One China policy of the United States. We can also see the Congress bypassing a law to clearly state the Six Assurances, which were added to the framework of the One China policy.

From the TAIPEI Act and the Taiwan Travel Act, we can see that Congress is going further than the White House in promoting U.S.-Taiwan relations. With that, the third type of role Congress can play is a checking role. When Congress thinks the White House has done something not favorable to Taiwan or in the interest of the United States, Congress will do something to check and balance the White House’s behavior and force policy changes. The Congress can really play an institutional role. We must also keep in mind that sometimes individual behaviors will also cause some very serious consequences. The most recent case is the visit of former Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan. It triggered high-level tensions not only across the Taiwan Strait but also between the United States and China. If we go back further and look at the U.S. visit of Li Denghui in 1995, it was widely believed that Congress pressured President Clinton to change his previous commitment to Beijing and allow Li to pay a so-called private visit to the United States. Thus, you can see that the Congress can do some very important things that might seriously impact U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

EC: You visited Taiwan as a young student. The cultural exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland have been the bridge connecting people across the Strait. What impact did cultural exchanges have on the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland? If many argue that educational exchanges between American and Chinese students can facilitate U.S.-China relations, can we use culture as a tool to connect youth from Taiwan and the mainland?

XQ: I definitely agree with that. I think such people-to-people cultural exchanges between the two sides across the strait will facilitate and promote cooperation and exchange between the two sides. We know that the two sides have been separated for more than seven decades, and there are a lot of misunderstandings and misperceptions, but through people-to-people exchanges, the Taiwanese can travel to mainland China and vice versa. They will personally feel the similarities and also the differences between the two sides, and that will help them understand each other better, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the other side. It will be helpful for them to foster a mutual understanding and respect.

The exchange is primarily positive and constructive, but we also have to admit there are some negative impacts. For example, the two sides might think we belong to one China and have a lot of similarities, but sometimes they will find more differences than similarities, and feel uncomfortable with the other side’s opinions on some issues. I think those so-called disadvantages can be cured by better and deeper exchanges. The people-to-people and cultural exchanges will be helpful for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

EC: What is the general perception of Taiwan among Chinese people on the mainland? How has it shifted from the time you first visited Taiwan? 

XQ: My first visit to Taiwan was in 2000 when I was still a PhD candidate. In the past two decades, I have visited Taiwan more than 40 or 50 times. The general perception of mainland Chinese towards Taiwan has a lot of continuity and consistency in that most of the mainland Chinese believe that the two sides belong to one state and one China. The so-called Zhonghua-minzu (中华民族). Most of the mainland Chinese also admire the economic and social achievements of Taiwan. Most of the mainland Chinese think that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait would be conducive to both sides. Most of them also hope and believe the two sides can fulfill a final reunification, by peaceful means, preferably.

However, I have to admit that after several years of bad scenarios and increased tensions across the strait, we cannot deny that under the leadership of the DPP administration, more and more Chinese now have more negative attitudes towards Taiwan today compared to 20 years ago. It is also an undeniable fact that more and more people in mainland China are beginning to worry about the prospect or the possibility of a final reunification. They are worried about whether Taiwan will become more independent in whatever name or means, and that the two sides will be entrapped in a military conflict because of Taiwan’s pro-independence behaviors orchestrated by the DPP administration. Therefore, I think the perception has become much more complicated, and, to be frank, more negative than before, especially compared to 20 years ago.

EC: You talked about DPP, which is a perfect lead to the next question. Chen Shuibian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was the pro-independence party and has been trending more anti-China. Historically speaking, how did DPP grow its influence, and what impact can a third consecutive DPP term under Lai Qingde have on Taiwanese people and U.S.-China relations? 

XQ: The establishment of the DPP actually happened under Jiang Jingguo. At that time, in order to maintain social stability and push forward political reforms on the Taiwanese island, Jiang Jingguo started to allow the opposition party operations represented by the DPP. Then, after Li Denghui took power, in order to check and balance the opposition force in the KMT, he tried to help the DPP become stronger and more powerful by giving a lot of opportunities and more space for the DPP’s development. After that, because of the division of the KMT, Chen Shuibian became the leader of Taiwan in 2000, and, by 0.2% in 2004, Chen was reelected. During his 8-year rule, the DPP achieved great developments and learned how to control the economic and social forces based on the interests of the party. He also advocated for a Taiwan independence agenda and divided the Taiwan society into the blue camp and the green camp. In 2008, Ma Yingjiu and the KMT came back. In his eight-year rule, the KMT somewhat repaired its party vigor, but unfortunately, in 2016, the KMT lost again to Tsai Ing-wen, and now we see Lai Qingde get elected after 8 years of the Tsai administration.

You can see in the past two decades, the DPP has developed from a very weak, small party into a dominant political force on the island, and, to be frank, has made the KMT, or the so-called blue camp, weaker. The DPP definitely has its own advantages. They know how to mobilize the people, run a campaign, and defeat the opposition party, including the KMT and other parties like the TPP led by Ke Wenzhe, and the People First Party led by Song Chuyu. The DPP has become a very seasoned political party. Of course, some historical events helped the DPP achieve its current position, but we have to admit that the DPP has been very good at campaigning and using historical, political, economic, and social issues to make a profit for itself.

EC: The DPP may not know some things, but it certainly knows how to defeat the KMT in recent years. In the recent decade, the DPP’s de-sinicization (去中国化) policies have been criticized by many in China, even by some Kuomintang officials. What is a general timeline of DPP’s de-sinicization, and how did it make the youth in Taiwan more pro-independence?

XQ: To be fair, the so-called desinicization process was started by the KMT rather than the DPP. Li Denghui initiated desinicization in history classes on the island to promote his two-state basis. This effort was strengthened by the DPP. If they want to promote Taiwan independence, they must educate the Taiwanese kids that Taiwan is not a part of China and the Taiwanese are not Chinese. The best way for the DPP to achieve its goal is to preach that the Taiwanese people and the Republic of China (ROC) has no relevance with mainland China. For example, they will teach the young generation that the highest mountain of ROC is not Mount Everest but the Yushan Mountain in Taiwan, and the longest river of ROC is not the Yangtze River but the Zhuoshui River. They would say that dynasties like Xia, Shang, Zhou, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing have no relevance in the history of Taiwan. That’s for political purposes. The DPP put great efforts into desinicization, which will be helpful for the so-called state-building of Taiwan. That is, Taiwan is Taiwan, and China is China. It was promoting that Taiwan is an independent nation with no relevance to the Chinese nation. The education of desinicization covered dimensions not only in history but also in politics and culture. For example, the DPP will tell the Taiwanese that they have the Taiwan culture, and that has no relevance to the Chinese culture. It’s a systematic approach for the DPP, but the core purpose of the omissions is to tell the Taiwanese that Taiwan is not with China.

EC: Is that independence movement primarily driven by political ideology, or was it a strategic move to secure military assistance and support in general from the United States?

XQ: I don’t think they promoted Taiwan independence to secure military assistance from the United States. It was mainly driven by political ideology and political interest. It’s the fundamental ideology of the DPP to promote Taiwan independence. The DPP was not established to promote Taiwan independence but to oppose the dictatorship of the KMT, the so-called White Terror. However, when they wanted to separate the DPP from the KMT, they thought it would be very useful for the DPP to be pro-independence. They thought that the KMT always wanted to restore its relationship with mainland China, but the DPP wanted nothing to do with the mainland. This is the key feature that separates the DPP from the KMT. Now, many DPP politicians realize that there is almost no possibility of achieving Taiwan independence because of the pressure from mainland China. The reason they still make great efforts to promote Taiwan independence is mainly political interest, not for any ideals. The DPP has become more optimistic nowadays because they think that if they promote the intervention agenda, they can better unite their supporters to crash the KMT and make economic profit. Nowadays, this has become less ideological and more political.

EC: In your 2020 paper “Having much in common? Changes and continuity in Beijing’s Taiwan policy”, you suggested that China has continued to prioritize peaceful unification. What are the challenges in a peaceful unification? Taiwan resistance? U.S. protection? 

XQ: Peace is not the final goal of mainland China. Reunification is. Thus, for mainland China, the biggest concern is the pro-independence provocations from the DPP authorities. Lai Qingde has said that the ROC and the PRC are not subordinate to each other. It’s a confession of Taiwan independence, and it reflects the political goals of the DPP politicians. For many in China, it has become impossible for the Taiwan authorities, especially the DPP, to accept that the two sides belong to one China. It means reunification will become very difficult, if not impossible, unless Beijing uses non-peaceful means.

The momentum of Taiwan independence on the island is the biggest challenge for mainland China to fulfill peaceful reunification. The other challenge is the media neutralization of Taiwan issues. We can clearly see the arms sales and the military funding from the United States to Taiwan. They are also cooperating on military training and high-level military technology. It’s caused Beijing to worry that Taiwan will pursue independence by force (以武谋独). It means the Taiwan issue will trend towards a military issue instead of a political issue. It might compel mainland China to fulfill reunification by non-peaceful means.

Those are two major challenges for peaceful reunification. For China, there is no way to accept two Chinas, no way to accept one China and one Taiwan, a state backed by the United States. America plans to contain the rise of China by playing the Taiwan card. Many elements contributed to the growing concern of China. That’s why more and more people have become pessimistic about the prospect of a peaceful reunification with Taiwan.

EC: Many on the internet think that America’s involvement in Iran opened a golden window for the Chinese military to take Taiwan by force. How would you evaluate the situation? Is there validity to their observations?  

XQ: I don’t think so. There’s no reason for mainland China to use force because of what happened in Europe, the Middle East, or Latin America. Peaceful reunification has been the principle and strategy of mainland China for decades. President Xi and all the Chinese leaders have reiterated that peaceful unification is the best way for China, not only for the mainland but also for Taiwan, and that Taiwan and mainland China will try their best to achieve a peaceful reunification. Given the concern that the Taiwan independence momentum will become so strong and go beyond the red line, Beijing may be compelled to use force. Beijing has listed clear red lines, and military conflict will only be triggered if the Taiwan authority goes beyond the red lines. There are no other reasons for Beijing to use force. I don’t agree with those rumors.

EC: Recent international tensions have led many to question the viability of a peaceful unification. To what degree does Taiwan have to change to become a part of China, and is there anything the Chinese government can change to accommodate a Taiwan reunification? 

XQ: I think Beijing has been very accommodating to Taiwan. If Beijing is not as patient, the tension will be much higher, and the cross-strait relations will be much worse because Beijing has the power to do more. However, Beijing has always tried its best to fulfill peaceful unification, and Beijing believes that a period of peaceful development and integration will finally lead to a peaceful reunification. I don’t think Beijing would threaten Taiwan to accept reunification overnight, but it is trying to deter the possibility of Taiwan independence, which has been advocated consistently by the DPP. The peaceful development has reached historical peaks, with meetings and visits of the two sides every year, trade exchanges, and the blossoming of cultural ties. Let’s talk about how to achieve the final reunification in the future.

We can see that Beijing still has the confidence and patience, but if the DPP continues to make provocations, Beijing will use the tools in its toolbox to contain Taiwan independence. The DPP can follow suit of the KMT, which means simply accepting that the two sides belong to one China and Taiwan is a part of China, even though the DPP will not say publicly that it accepts the 1992 Consensus. If the DPP can reach some kind of consensus with Beijing, Beijing will be happy to conduct dialogues with the DPP. Peaceful unification is the principle, and One Country, Two Systems is the formula. Beijing has displayed flexibility in its “Two Systems Taiwan Resolution” (两制台湾方案) , which means that the One Country Two Systems formula in Taiwan will be different from the formula for Hong Kong and Macau. The Taiwan plan is more flexible than the Hong Kong or Macau formula, but if the Taiwan authority does not accept the basic principle that Taiwan is part of China, then there is no way for Beijing to have any constructive interactions with the DPP.

EC: You talked about Ma Yingjiu and his interactions with the mainland. However, it seems most of the politicians on the island do not want anything to do with the 1992 Consensus. Do you think it may be until their successors or a future generation in Taiwan to reinforce the 1992 Consensus?

XQ: Beijing cares more about One China than the term 1992 Consensus, and Beijing has said if the DPP or any political forces on the island, even though they may not support 1992 Consensus, can express clearly that the two sides belong to one China and that Taiwan is part of China, and, if they can find some ways to express or to state that principle, it doesn’t matter if you call it the 2025 consensus or 2030 consensus. The connotation of the 1992 Consensus is the most important thing, and it is Beijing’s political foundation for any official and political interaction between the two sides. Otherwise, Beijing doesn’t know whether they are talking with another state, another central government, or another region in China. That’s a problem of principle, and there is no way for Beijing to make any concessions on that issue. No matter which politicians rule the Taiwanese island, Beijing will not accept it, change its position, or change its mind.

Edison Chen is an intern for China Focus at The Carter Center and studies Public Policy at Duke University.

The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.