Against the backdrop of turmoil in the Middle East, President Donald Trump is planning a visit to Beijing in late March and early April. Whether this trip can bring a measure of stability to the U.S.–China relations and the world has become a question drawing widespread attention.
On this topic, we interviewed Zhiqun Zhu, professor of political science at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania, a veteran scholar of international affairs, and editor-in-chief of the English-language journal China and the World. From both theoretical and policy perspectives, Professor Zhu offers an in-depth analysis of the overall state of U.S.–China relations, the potential outcomes of Trump’s visit, risks in the Taiwan Strait, and the perceptual gaps between China and the United States.
Juan Zhang: Trump is about to visit China, one of the most closely watched diplomatic moves of his second term. Some observers believe that compared with his first term and the Biden administration, the overall level of tension in U.S.–China relations has somewhat eased. Do you agree with this assessment?
Zhiqun Zhu: Overall, it is fair to say that U.S.–China relations are currently in a relatively stable phase. People still remember that a few years ago the United States adopted what could be described as a “whole-of-government, whole-of-society” approach to confronting China, and on many issues it also coordinated with allies to exert pressure on Beijing. The current situation is clearly different from that period.
In this respect, the policy orientation of Trump’s second term has played an important role. Trump himself places significant emphasis on direct communication and dialogue between top leaders and tends to push for major deals or arrangements through leader-to-leader interactions. In that sense, U.S.–China relations have indeed improved to some degree. By contrast, during the Biden administration, although there was also an emphasis on leader-level communication—Biden even noted that he had spent more time with China’s top leader than anyone else—those personal interactions unfortunately did not translate into real opportunities to improve bilateral relations.
Another factor is that during Trump’s first term, U.S. policy toward China was heavily influenced by hardliners such as Mike Pompeo. In his second term, however, Trump himself has taken a stronger lead on China policy. In many ways, he is personally directing China-related affairs. His approach appears more pragmatic and less constrained by ideological considerations.
A second factor is the international environment shaped by Trump’s “America First” policy. The United States has taken a sweeping approach on tariffs, applying them broadly even to allies. This has caused resentment and anxiety among traditional partners and has somewhat weakened U.S. relations with them. As a result, some American allies have begun to actively improve their relations with China. In recent months, leaders from Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, South Korea, and Australia have all visited China to promote better bilateral ties. From China’s perspective, this has somewhat improved the overall international environment and indirectly contributed to greater stability in U.S.–China relations.
A third factor is that the current international situation has significantly stretched and distracted U.S. diplomatic and strategic resources. The Russia–Ukraine war, the situation in Venezuela, and the recent U.S. and Israeli military actions against Iran have all demanded substantial attention. Under such circumstances, Washington has relatively less capacity to focus on the Asia-Pacific. For example, the North Korea issue currently seems to receive little attention from Washington, let alone a full-scale effort to confront China.
Taken together, these factors have placed U.S.–China relations in a relatively moderated phase, and this situation may continue for some time. That said, we should not be overly optimistic. The structural contradictions between the two countries and the broader framework of great-power competition remain in place. In other words, the current stability is temporary, while deeper underlying issues persist.
JZ: From a practical standpoint, what concrete outcomes or understandings would the two sides need to reach during this visit in order to maintain the current relative stability in U.S.–China relations?
ZZ: In my view, preparations for Trump’s visit appears somewhat rushed, and the objectives are not entirely clear. Expectations are therefore relatively modest, and it is probably wise not to set the bar too high. Of course, both sides hope the visit will be successful and help maintain the current stable relationship.
From a practical perspective, several areas of consensus or tacit understanding would be important.
First, both sides should continue the “truce” on tariffs. They should avoid further escalation and refrain from imposing new tariff measures on each other. A tariff war benefits neither side, so maintaining the current pause should be achievable.
Second, the two countries could expand economic and trade cooperation, particularly through increased Chinese purchases of American products such as agricultural goods, aircraft, and energy resources, including oil. Recently, the United States has suggested that China reduce its imports of Russian oil. If conditions permit, China could increase its purchases of U.S. energy. Both sides could also make adjustments in sensitive sectors such as rare earths and advanced technologies. On that basis, they could gradually remove unnecessary tariffs and export restrictions in the future.
Third, people-to-people exchanges should be expanded. For example, China could consider granting U.S. citizens a 30-day visa-free entry policy, encouraging more Americans to visit China for tourism, study, and exchanges. This would have multiple benefits: it could stimulate China’s economy, promote mutual understanding between the two societies, improve the public opinion environment on both sides, and demonstrate China’s confidence and soft power.
People-to-people exchanges also include restoring certain institutional mechanisms. The United States could consider resuming the Fulbright program and other educational exchanges. In addition, reopening the Houston and Chengdu consulates, which were previously closed, would benefit both sides. The closure of these consulates damaged economic, cultural, and social exchanges between the two countries. Houston and Chengdu represent important inland regions in each country and play significant roles in trade and social interaction.
Fourth is the Taiwan issue, where both sides need some degree of tacit understanding. Given U.S. interests, Washington will not abandon the Taiwan card. It is unrealistic for China to expect the United States to oppose Taiwanese independence and actively support reunification. However, the United States could exercise restraint in arms sales to Taiwan and in upgrading official ties with Taipei, so as to avoid turning the Taiwan issue into a trigger for military conflict between China and the United States.
At the same time, China could also take steps to reduce tensions. Recently, the People’s Liberation Army has reduced its military activities around the Taiwan Strait, something that has been noted in foreign media reports. In addition, Chinese diplomatic missions in the Middle East recently assisted Taiwanese tourists in returning home via transit in Shanghai. These are goodwill signals that help ease tensions.
If the two sides can reach some understanding in these areas, I would consider the visit a success, and it could contribute to stability in bilateral relations for some time to come.
JZ: You have previously studied power transition theory. As China’s comprehensive national strength rises, some Western scholars worry about the so-called “Thucydides Trap.” Do you think this theoretical framework still applies to understanding current U.S.–China relations?
ZZ: From the perspective of international relations theory, today’s U.S.–China competition differs significantly from the U.S.–Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. The Cold War competition was largely concentrated in military and ideological domains, whereas the current U.S.–China competition is an unprecedented form of comprehensive great-power rivalry. It spans military and security issues as well as economic and trade relations, international order, development models, governance systems, diplomacy, and culture.
At the same time, the two countries remain highly interdependent. Despite intense competition, they still need to cooperate in certain areas such as combating drug trafficking, addressing climate change, and ensuring food safety. Their economies are also difficult to fully decouple. Thus, the current relationship is characterized by a mixture of competition and cooperation.
As for power transition theory, my first English-language monograph in 2005 explored power transition and U.S.–China relations—long before the term “Thucydides Trap” became popular. More than twenty years later, I still believe it remains a valuable analytical framework for understanding the complexity of U.S.–China relations and the roots of potential conflict. However, the theory must evolve with the times.
Over the next two or three decades, U.S.–China relations will likely be characterized by long-term competition, limited cooperation, and an effort to avoid conflict.
Unlike historical power transitions, today’s world is in the nuclear age. China and the United States are both nuclear powers capable of destroying each other. Nuclear deterrence was not a factor in earlier power transitions. In addition, economic and social ties between the two countries are extremely close, which helps mitigate some of the pressures created by structural rivalry. Therefore, the key question today is not simply whether power transition leads to war, but rather how conflict can be avoided and peaceful coexistence achieved. The causes of conflict and the conditions for peace are precisely the two central issues in international relations research.
JZ: As U.S.–China competition intensifies, the Taiwan issue has gained increasing attention in American politics. What do you see as the biggest risks in the Taiwan Strait in the coming years?
ZZ: Indeed, some American politicians and members of Congress seem more enthusiastic about Taiwan-related issues than about domestic matters, and that deserves attention. In my view, the biggest risk in the coming years is miscalculation.
For example, former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Admiral Philip Davidson once proposed the idea of a “2027 window,” suggesting that China might take military action against Taiwan around that time. He made this statement during a congressional hearing in 2021, but it was not based on thorough analysis—it was simply one person’s view. Yet many American politicians and even some scholars now treat 2027 as a supposed deadline for Chinese military action.
The Democratic Progressive Party authorities in Taiwan have used this narrative to accelerate and expand arms purchases from the United States. If policy decisions are made based on such assumptions, miscalculations or accidental escalation could occur.
In reality, China’s basic policy on Taiwan has not changed for a long time: peaceful reunification remains the goal. Except under extreme circumstances, China would not easily resort to the use of force.
The problem now is that all sides seem to be preparing for war, while very few are seriously discussing how to avoid it. The United States continues to sell arms to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, while political differences prevent dialogue and trust between authorities on both sides of the Strait. This situation indeed carries significant risks. For both sides of the Strait, dialogue rather than confrontation should be the top priority.
At the same time, all parties should avoid provocative or insulting rhetoric. The United States should not “fan the flames,” but instead encourage the restoration of cross-strait exchanges. Simply arming Taiwan under the so-called “porcupine strategy” may not necessarily bring peace to the Taiwan Strait and could even prove counterproductive.
JZ: You have long studied changes in China’s diplomatic thinking. How do you evaluate China’s shift toward a more proactive and pragmatic diplomacy?
ZZ: I believe China’s diplomatic transformation is a natural result of changing times and China’s own development.
First, China has become one of the world’s largest and most powerful economies, and its overseas interests have expanded significantly. Chinese investment abroad has grown, and the number of Chinese citizens working and living overseas has increased substantially. Under such circumstances, the earlier diplomatic approach—relatively low-profile, reactive, and sometimes heavily influenced by ideology—is no longer suitable. Chinese diplomacy must therefore become more proactive and pragmatic.
Second, great-power competition has pushed China to move away from the earlier emphasis on “keeping a low profile” toward a more active approach that stresses “making a difference.” When Chinese diplomacy becomes more assertive, some observers describe it as “tough” or label it “wolf warrior diplomacy.” From China’s perspective, however, responding more actively to external pressure is both natural and necessary.
Overall, I believe China’s diplomatic transformation has been successful. Whether in relations with the United States, Europe, the Global South, or Asian neighbors, China’s relationships have generally remained friendly and stable. Of course, there are still problems with a few countries such as Japan and the Philippines, and China needs to continue improving these neighboring relationships.
At the same time, China still has room to improve its international image and should make more friends, including among foreigners who may misunderstand or even oppose China. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once said, “Having strong fists does not necessarily mean having the stronger argument.” As China’s hard power grows, it should also strengthen its soft power, continue reform and opening up, and project a more confident, open, and inclusive image.
In addition, as a major power, China could take clearer positions and play a greater role in international affairs. For instance, on issues such as the Russia–Ukraine war or conflicts in the Middle East, simply sending special envoys may not be enough. China could operate at a higher diplomatic level—through high-level dialogues, leader-to-leader communication, or multilateral diplomacy—to push for ceasefires and negotiations, demonstrating more clearly its role as a responsible major power.
JZ: You have long conducted research and teaching on China in the United States. What do you see as the biggest perceptual gaps between the two countries today?
ZZ: There are certainly different views on this question, but I believe several misunderstandings exist on both sides.
One major misperception in the United States is the belief that China’s ultimate goal is to replace the United States and become the world’s dominant power. Under this assumption, Washington often adopts a reflexive policy of confrontation aimed at containing China’s development.
On the Chinese side, a common cognitive bias is the strong emphasis on the narrative that “the East is rising and the West is declining.” While China has indeed achieved remarkable progress, it still faces many challenges, including income inequality, slower economic growth, regional disparities, population aging, and insufficient soft power. Therefore, China should remain modest and clear-eyed about its development.
Another perception in American society is that China is a highly centralized country without freedom. But if China truly lacked space for freedom and innovation, it would be difficult to explain the breakthroughs the country has achieved in technology and innovation in recent years. Such perceptions therefore deserve reconsideration.
Conversely, some people in China believe that American society is broadly anti-China and hostile toward Chinese people, including Chinese scholars and students. In reality, while certain U.S. media narratives and some political rhetoric have shaped public opinion, and while some U.S. policies toward China are unfriendly, ordinary Americans do not harbor an inherent anti-China sentiment. Many Americans are impressed by China’s development and believe the United States could learn from China in areas such as infrastructure.
In the context of great-power competition, expanding people-to-people exchanges is extremely important. I therefore suggest that China consider granting longer visa-free stays for American citizens so that more Americans can see China’s development firsthand.
Similarly, when Chinese tourists visit the United States, they should not limit themselves to major cities but also travel to smaller towns and rural areas. Most ordinary Americans are sincere and friendly people. Only through more direct contact and exchange can misunderstandings between the two societies gradually diminish, allowing both sides to appreciate each other and coexist peacefully.