As tensions in the Middle East persist, is China “taking sides”? Is the intensity of U.S.-China competition declining, or merely being recalibrated? And as fewer Americans gain firsthand knowledge of China, is Washington at greater risk of misjudgment? The Monitor interviewed Sun Taiyi, associate professor of political science at Christopher Newport University in Virginia. In this interview, Professor Sun offers an in-depth analysis of China’s diplomatic posture amid the current Iran crisis, the state of “Mutually Assured Economic Destruction” (MAED) in U.S.-China relations, and the evolving perceptions of China within the United States.
Juan Zhang (JZ): Western scholars like to group China and Iran into the same camp. Has China’s diplomatic policy in this crisis shown any tendency to “take sides”? How do you assess China’s overall response to this crisis?
Taiyi Sun (TS): The premise of grouping China together with countries like Iran, Russia, or North Korea as a unified camp (CRINK) is itself somewhat misleading. China’s relationships with these countries are fundamentally different from alliance structures we see in the West, such as NATO. Even in the case of North Korea, where a formal treaty exists, the practical implications are far more limited. So analytically, it is not very accurate to assume China has a bloc-like alignment with Iran, Russia and North Korea.
In this particular crisis, China has not demonstrated a “one-sided” position. Official statements from the Chinese foreign ministry have clearly emphasized opposition to attacks on the Gulf states and condemnation of indiscriminate strikes on civilians and non-military targets. Importantly, this includes criticism that can be applied to Iran’s actions as well. But that should not be interpreted as China siding with the United States. Rather, it reflects a broader and more pragmatic approach: many Gulf states are also important partners of China, and taking an exclusively pro-Iran position would be strategically risky. In that sense, China is not choosing sides—it is managing relationships.
More broadly, China appears to view this crisis through a structural lens. From Beijing’s perspective, the United States is, to some extent, undermining elements of the international order it helped build after World War II. China’s response, therefore, is not to escalate militarily, but to emphasize institutional and diplomatic alternatives—particularly solutions within the United Nations framework. One could summarize China’s approach as follows: “not neutrality for its own sake, but stability through institutional restraint.” This posture is not only consistent with China’s long-standing diplomatic principles but also closely aligned with its strategic interests. I also call this “order succession” in the sense that the rising power (here China) is not challenging the hegemon by advocating an alternative set of order, but is actually adhering to the same rule-based international order that the U.S. helped establish, promote, and benefit greatly from, while the U.S., the status quo power, is abandoning such an old order, in the hope to “Make America Great Again.”
JZ: Compared with Trump’s first term and the Biden administration, how would you characterize the current state of U.S.-China relations? Has the intensity of competition between the two countries decreased, or have they reached a certain degree of tacit understanding?
TS: I would characterize the current state of U.S.–China relations as what I call “Mutually Assured Economic Destruction,” or MAED. This is a condition that emerged particularly through the rounds of escalation we saw in 2025, when both sides tested—and revealed—their respective economic leverage. As a result, each now has a much clearer understanding of how much damage it can inflict on the other, but also how much damage it would suffer in return.
In that sense, the intensity of competition has, in some ways, decreased, and short-term stability has actually increased. But this should not be mistaken for improved trust or better relations. On the contrary, it reflects a more cautious form of rivalry. Stability today is not built on goodwill—it is built on fear of reciprocal damage. The dynamic of export controls on rare earths versus advanced semiconductors is a good example: both sides now recognize that these are not just tools of pressure, but also sources of vulnerability.
So compared to Trump’s first term or even parts of the Biden administration, the relationship today is not necessarily less competitive—it is more calibrated. The two sides are not converging, nor are they reaching a genuine strategic understanding. Rather, they are learning where the red lines are through experience. If there is any ‘tacit understanding,’ it is not cooperation, but mutual restraint under conditions of shared vulnerability.
JZ: Do you think the upcoming Xi-Trump summit meeting could serve as an opportunity to promote a temporary easing of relations? In practical terms, to what extent can leader-level diplomacy help alleviate—or even change—the structural contradictions between the two countries?
TS: The upcoming leaders’ meeting could certainly help sustain a temporary stabilization, particularly by extending the current trade truce and reinforcing mechanisms that have already proven effective in preventing further escalation. We may even see efforts to institutionalize certain arrangements—for example, through more formalized channels such as a trade board or other regularized consultation mechanisms. In that sense, leader-level diplomacy still plays an important role in managing tensions and preventing deterioration.
However, it is important not to overstate what such meetings can achieve. They are unlikely to fundamentally resolve—or even significantly alleviate—the structural contradictions underlying U.S.–China relations. At the core, the current stability is not the result of reconciliation, but of what I describe as Reciprocal Vulnerability Interdependence (RVI). Both sides now possess retaliatory tools that can impose unacceptable costs on the other, which naturally encourages restraint.
So, rather than viewing this as a genuine “reset” or “warming” of relations, it is more accurate to see it as managed competition under constraints. Summit diplomacy can stabilize the surface, but it cannot change the structure. The leaders’ meeting may buy time and reduce immediate risks, but the deeper strategic tensions will remain firmly in place.
JZ: You have been conducting research in China studies in the U.S. for a long time. Regarding the report by the Washington-based nonprofit US-China Education Trust on the decline of China expertise in America, have you experienced this trend firsthand in your teaching and research?
TS: Yes, I would say there is a very real and noticeable shift, both in academia and in broader social and political environments. Compared to ten years ago—or even just a few years ago—the situation for Chinese nationals and Chinese Americans in the United States has become significantly more challenging. There is clearly a higher level of scrutiny from the government, and at the societal level, a segment of the population has also become more cautious, if not suspicious, toward individuals of Chinese background.
This is particularly evident in academic exchanges and mobility. Many Chinese and Chinese American scholars—especially in STEM fields—now face increased questioning and scrutiny when traveling between the U.S. and China. This does not necessarily affect everyone equally, but the perception of risk has increased. And perception itself matters. Even a small number of high-profile cases can have a chilling effect on an entire academic community.
At the same time, the flow in the other direction is also being affected. Some Americans traveling to China now perceive greater uncertainty or risk, and even if actual incidents are limited, individual cases can discourage a much broader group. One important consequence is the decline in the number of American students studying in China. Over time, this means fewer “China experts” with direct, on-the-ground experience. When fewer people go to China, fewer people truly understand China. This has long-term implications: within the U.S. policy community, there may be a growing gap between how China is discussed and how China actually operates, as fewer analysts have firsthand exposure or fieldwork experience.
JZ: A recent article published by The Washington Quarterly suggests that there is no true consensus within the United States on competition with China, with experts across different fields offering markedly divergent assessments. How do you view this so-called “cognitive divide”?
TS: I think the idea of “cognitive fragmentation” in the U.S. approach to China is partly valid, but it can also be overstated depending on where you look. The article you mentioned actually draws on research that I conducted with my co-author Chris Carothers. In that study, we systematically examined China-related legislation in Congress in the past decade, as well as public statements from all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on social media. What we found was not increasing fragmentation, but rather a gradual convergence—especially at the elite policymaking level.
To be sure, there are still meaningful differences between Democrats and Republicans in terms of issue emphasis—some focus more on human rights, others on economic security or technological competition. But what is striking is that across these differences, there is a growing shared baseline: China is increasingly viewed as a strategic competitor that requires policy response. The disagreement today is less about whether to compete with China, and more about how to compete.
More importantly, this emerging consensus is reflected not just in rhetoric, but in action. China-related legislation has increasingly shifted from symbolic signaling to substantive measures that have real-world implications for U.S.–China relations—whether in export controls, investment restrictions, or supply chain policies. So while there may still be variation in perception at the expert level, at the policy level, we are actually seeing consolidation rather than fragmentation. What looks like division in discourse may in fact coexist with convergence in policy.
JZ: From your perspective, does the current issue in U.S. perceptions of China stem more from a lack of information, or from a “cognitive filter” shaped by long-standing narrative choices? Between the two, which has a deeper impact?
TS: I would say both factors matter, but if I had to prioritize, the deeper issue is not simply a lack of information, but the presence of a “cognitive filter” shaped by long-term narratives. That said, information constraints still play an important role. For many Americans—from voters to members of Congress—the primary focus remains domestic issues, and there is relatively limited direct exposure to China. In that context, the rise of misinformation and AI-generated content further complicates the information environment. If people are not actively verifying sources, but instead passively consuming information, what they receive is often either oversimplified or outright misleading.
However, what is more consequential is how information is interpreted once it enters the system. Over time, repeated political narratives—especially from more hawkish voices—have created a lens through which China is viewed. But interestingly, since the beginning of Trump’s second term, we have started to see some subtle shifts in public attitudes, which are also reflected in longitudinal polling such as Pew surveys. As certain criticisms of China are repeated over and over, some Americans begin to notice similar or even more severe issues within the United States itself. At the same time, there are areas where China is perceived to be performing relatively well, which complicates the narrative.
In a highly polarized society, foreign policy itself becomes domestically contested. For example, on issues like the Gaza conflict, segments of the U.S. public that oppose the government’s position may find China’s stance more aligned with their own views. So the cognitive filter is not static—it is being contested and, in some cases, recalibrated. As a result, while structural biases remain strong, there is also emerging variation in how China is perceived across different segments of American society.
JZ: From a medium- to long-term perspective, where do you see the greatest risk of miscalculation between China and the United States? Can such miscalculations be avoided through policy adjustments, or are they, to some extent, structurally inevitable?
TS: From a medium- to long-term perspective, the greatest risk of miscalculation in U.S.–China relations lies in a possible breakdown of the current condition of Mutually Assured Economic Destruction (MAED). Right now, both sides still retain meaningful leverage over each other, and that reciprocal vulnerability creates caution. But if one side were to successfully neutralize most of the other’s leverage while still remaining exposed itself, the probability and intensity of confrontation could rise significantly. In other words, stability today depends not on harmony, but on the continued existence of reciprocal constraints.
That said, the broader structural picture still contains important stabilizing forces. The two economies remain deeply intertwined and, in many areas, highly complementary. So, despite intensifying strategic rivalry, there is still a great deal of complex interdependence and what I call Reciprocal Vulnerability Interdependence (RVI). These structural conditions help preserve a degree of stability in the relationship. At the individual and institutional levels, regular communication between leaders, as well as open channels at multiple levels of government and society, can further prolong that stability by reducing uncertainty and preventing routine frictions from spiraling out of control.
At the same time, certain issues involving core interests—especially Taiwan—still carry the potential to rapidly worsen bilateral relations. In some cases, this comes from the fragmented nature of U.S. policymaking itself: the White House and Congress do not fully control one another, and the eventual outcome may be a compromise that is not actually optimal for U.S. interests but still destabilizing for the bilateral relationship, such as frequent congressional or senior-level delegations to Taiwan. In other cases, domestic interest groups may push Washington toward steps that increase instability, such as continued expansion of arms sales to Taiwan. So the real danger is not simply hostile intent, but the possibility that competitive signaling, bureaucratic fragmentation, and domestic political pressure could interact in ways neither side fully intends. Because these dynamics are the product of ongoing political bargaining, they are difficult to eliminate entirely—even if they can be managed.