The Energy Arms Race w/ Dr. Isobel Sheldon

A conversation with on battery materials, U.S.-China competition, and U.S. energy independence
Querrec Europeasiamoscowchina 1984

Car factory named “Shanghai” at Anting. Anting (Shanghai suburb), China. 14th May 1984. Source. 

For much of the late twentieth century, American debates over energy independence centered on oil, shaped by the memory of the 1970s embargoes and a decades-long effort to reduce reliance on foreign crude. That framing has shifted. As electricity demand rises with vehicle electrification, grid modernization, and the rapid expansion of data centers, the question of energy security increasingly turns on batteries and the materials used to make them. Total US lithium-ion battery demand is projected to reach 182 GWh in 2026, with stationary storage accounting for 37% of it, yet the supply chain behind that demand remains concentrated in a single strategic competitor. China dominates multiple layers of the battery value chain, from mineral refining to active materials and cell production, and it supplied 66.5% of US lithium-ion battery imports in the second quarter of 2026. Beijing has also shown a willingness to use that position as leverage. Its October 2025 expansion of export controls on rare earths and battery-related materials was paused under a bilateral trade truce, but the suspension is temporary, and whether controls resume after November 10, 2026 will depend on the state of political and trade relations at that point.

Domestic policy has added a second source of uncertainty. Industrial strategy has swung between administrations, from the subsidy-driven approach of the Inflation Reduction Act to a narrower focus on targeted funding and trade protection, and nearly $24 billion in announced US battery projects have been canceled since January 2025 as federal EV tax credits ended. Federal support has not disappeared, but analysts and industry executives say current funding is small relative to what would be needed to meaningfully challenge China’s position. Taken together, these pressures suggest that the future of American energy independence will be determined less by what the country can extract or assemble than by whether it can build a durable, policy-resilient industrial base in the midstream processes that connect raw materials to finished batteries

Few people have watched this shift as closely as Dr. Isobel Sheldon OBE, whose career in battery technology spans nearly every stage of the supply chain the United States is now trying to rebuild. Dr. Sheldon has been working on batteries since before most people had heard of a hybrid car. Her career runs from defense electronics at GEC Marconi to building what she describes as the world’s first commercially available plug-in hybrid, to helping Chinese automakers learn to design EV batteries in the early 2010s, to shaping the UK’s national battery strategy. Now at Western CAM, she is focused on what she calls the “missing middle” of the battery supply chain: the active materials, like LFP cathode, that sit between the mine and the gigafactory and are still made almost entirely in China. In our conversation, she explains why that midstream gets so little attention, how allies fit into a non-Chinese supply chain, why she thinks the West should emulate and reverse the joint venture model China used on Western automakers, and what the US stands to lose if it doesn’t build this industry in the next decade.

A 23-year veteran of the battery industry, Dr. Sheldon was awarded an OBE by Queen Elizabeth II for her contributions to electric vehicle battery development. She has held senior leadership roles at Johnson Matthey, Cummins, Britishvolt, and UKBIC, and currently serves on the Board of Trustees for the Faraday Institution. Fluent in English, speaks French, she brings deep international experience, including commercial engagements across China (CATARC, JAC, GAC), Japan, UK and Europe.

Georgia Pollard: To start, could you tell us a bit about yourself and your background, what drew you to Western CAM, and give a brief overview of what the company is and what it aims to do?

Dr. Isobel Sheldon OBE: My journey into sustainable transportation started in 1978, watching my father repair his internal combustion engine car. I was horrified that we were taking the air we breathe, mixing it with fuel, setting fire to it, and releasing a load of gases that he told me to stay away from because they were dangerous. I thought, this is mad. There has to be a better, cleaner way of moving people around without half killing them. That started my thinking process. I was eight years old, so pretty advanced thinking for an eight-year-old.

I started my career in defense electronics at GEC Marconi, in the technical processing of semiconductors, diodes, and surface acoustic wave devices, so I have a technical background in some of that chemistry. Fast forward to 2002: I was working in the automotive industry, and one of my customers was Toyota. I was standing in their technical center in Nagoya, Japan, looking at the first-generation Prius and thinking, right, I know something about batteries and electrochemistry. I could see how the hybrid system worked from the display in front of me, and I knew we could do something better.

So I gave up my very well-paid job in the automotive industry, started a company, bought a second-generation Prius, and worked with partner companies to create what became the world’s first commercially available plug-in hybrid. That was in 2003 and 2004. We then started designing and developing batteries for other companies. We gave Jaguar Land Rover their first lithium-ion battery, which they tested in a Freelander, worked with Tata Motors on fleet demonstration programs, developed battery systems for halo projects such as the Infiniti Emergee/Lotus 414e and built large systems for 18-meter electric buses.

That took me through to about 2013. After the financial crisis, R&D revenue had pretty much dried up worldwide, so I had to exit the business. I ended up at Ricardo as their battery specialist, spending time in China helping Chinese automakers learn how to design batteries for electric vehicles. So China’s dominance of the EV industry is partly my fault, going all the way back to 2013.

After that I had a series of roles. At Johnson Matthey as Engineering and Technical Director in their battery business, then the largest manufacturer of LFP cathode material in the world. Then part of the UK automotive council technical working group on electrification, before Faraday Battery Challenge existed, helping to work out how the UK economy needed to prepare for the end of the internal combustion engines that the UK automotive industry depended on and exported widely. That group’s work led to the Faraday Battery Challenge, the Faraday Institution, and the UK Battery Industrialisation Centre, which was built here in the UK. I also spent time at Britishvolt and wrote their technical plan. It’s a shame it wasn’t stuck to, because it would have worked. They spent too much money too quickly.

Then I went back to my roots. My first work in the lithium battery industry was using LFP cells in automotive applications, and after 23-odd years in the industry, I realized there was an opportunity to be competitive with China if we chose the right material and the right location to build it. That’s why we started Western CAM. We could see that LFP was a big gap in the U.S. economy. There’s a tariff barrier keeping Chinese manufacturers out, and if you choose a location with the right energy costs, there’s no reason you can’t compete on cost for those materials. And that’s how I ended co-founding Western CAM.

GP: Wonderful. I’ve joined a couple of meetings between CJPA and Western CAM, so I’ve heard your background once or twice, but I never realized it started with you watching your dad work on his combustion engine car.

IS: Yes, he was a chief technician in the Royal Air Force, so he always did his own car maintenance, and I used to help, hinder, him. It’s a handy skill to have. I can still rebuild engines, gearboxes, and lots of other things. I’m very mechanically minded. I also spent some time in fabrication engineering, so I know how to weld and program profile burners, machining centers, and robots. I’ve got a really well-rounded engineering background.

GP: You’ve written that battery materials are the next arms race that nobody is talking about. Why do you think the midstream gets so little attention in debates about energy independence, compared with mining or cell assembly?

IS: Everybody sees the big, bright, shiny lights of the gigafactory. It’s a multibillion-dollar investment that employs three or four thousand people, so everyone assumes cell manufacturing facilities are where the economic value is. The truth is they operate on razor-thin margins, and they’re better off vertically integrated into EV manufacturing or into companies building energy storage.

If you compare the West with China, China doesn’t mind thin margins. It wants the manufacturing capacity. Investors in the West want a return on investment, so the last thing they want to do is raise $4 billion and build a cell manufacturing facility, because the return just isn’t there.

With mining, you need land rights, and it takes a long time to bring a mine into production, somewhere between five and seven years. Then, once you’re digging material out of the ground, you have to find someone to refine it, and most of that capacity has traditionally sat in China anyway. So that doesn’t break the dependency either.

Active materials are really the secret sauce of the industry, because they’re the missing piece. A lot of people are talking about the “missing middle” at the moment, and that is pretty much the active materials. If you’re mining material out of the ground, you’re sending it to China for refining. That’s true for cobalt, nickel, and all of those materials. If you’re a cell manufacturer making LFP, which is now becoming the majority of the market, you have to buy that finished material from China, because that’s where the active materials are made.

So the United States needs an active materials manufacturing stream that doesn’t depend on raw materials from China. LFP is lithium, iron, phosphate, and oxygen, and those materials are all available outside China. You can have a non-China supply chain if you choose the right LFP material and make it the right way. And there’s money to be made. There’s margin there. It’s the only part of the value chain that actually makes a profit.

The other thing is that the capex is lower. It doesn’t cost billions of dollars. It’s a couple of hundred million dollars, and you’re in business.

GP: In a couple of the meetings I attended, you mentioned a few U.S. states you were looking at in particular because they were cheaper. I believe Arkansas was one of them?

IS: We were looking at a number of places in Arkansas and Missouri. We were also looking at Oklahoma. Missouri and Arkansas are coming out ahead of Oklahoma, because they have a really good understanding of what a battery is. They already have some technical capability, and in Arkansas, of course, you have direct lithium extraction from brines for lithium production. So those states already have an idea of what a battery is and what the industry around it needs to look like.

GP: What about these states gives them such a strong foundation for battery manufacturing? And were there any policy differences that made them easier places for you to consider building?

IS: We have to be really accurate about what’s already there. Missouri does have a cell manufacturer, Panasonic, but there’s no other cell manufacturing of any real scale in the state, and there’s none in Arkansas. So being close to an existing cell manufacturing industry isn’t really the point. It’s about access to available land, low cost power, and cheap land. You wouldn’t put a facility of this size somewhere like California. It just costs too much, in both energy and land.

The incentive programs are interesting, but other metrics rank higher. Our approach is: we’re looking at your state for these reasons, so come back with an incentive package that closes the loop for us.

GP: In your view, is there a version of U.S.-China relations in which battery supply chains are interdependent rather than separated? And what would that require from each side?

IS: I think that’s more of a general Western question than just a U.S. one. The United States has very specific geopolitics that set it apart from Europe. But I think reversing the China model is probably the way to go.

If you wind back to the 1990s and early 2000s, the automotive industry wanted access to the Chinese market because it was a huge growth opportunity. China said, okay, but you have to build a plant here, and if you build a plant here, you have to form a joint venture with a local Chinese automotive company. All the automakers said, great, and went and created the joint ventures.

Don’t forget, this came off the back of the 1990s. Think of Clinton, John Major, Tony Blair, all the major leaders who were hoping for political change in the former and current communist blocs and thought they could achieve it through trade. That’s why China was brought into the World Trade Organization, acceding in 2001. People believed that if you brought a capitalist system into a communist country, the politics would eventually change. In effect, China said, we’re going to take advantage of this and that change didn’t happen.

So all of these very high-tech and high quality automakers, Ford, GM, BMW, Mercedes, piled into China and simply taught the Chinese how to build a quality vehicle. Quite a few of us looked at it at the time and said, hang on, you’re just training your competition to come and sit on your lawn and eat your lunch at some point in the future. And hey presto, that’s what’s happened, I would argue that they are not raiding the refrigerator. Western automakers are in significant decline in China because the Chinese have become so good at this.

So what do we need to do in the battery industry? We should recognize the fact that the Chinese know how to do this at scale. We should collaborate them in to set up manufacturing plants, but require them to form joint ventures with existing local companies. Then the tech transfer flows the other way, and of course that’s exactly what China is trying to protect against right now. It’s the only way to level the playing field.

No matter how this pans out, the industry will rely on companies like Western CAM that already have the skills to do this. That’s what makes us unique. We don’t need to learn from the Chinese. We just need to raise the money to build the facility, and we can start manufacturing.

GP: The United States in particular has recently seen a rise in grid storage and data centers driving huge new demand for batteries. Does that change the case for domestic cathode production compared with when the conversation was mostly about EVs?

IS: It depends. There are different chemistries in the lithium-ion battery world, and they suit different applications. Companies like Panasonic or Tesla typically use very nickel-dominant chemistries, where energy density is really important because you want your electric vehicle to go as far as possible on a single charge. The problem is that nickel, cobalt, and some of the other materials are quite expensive. The other problem is that those cathode materials are quite volatile. They break down at around the mid-200s Celsius. LFP, by contrast, uses cheap, abundant raw materials and is a very, very stable cathode material, so you don’t have the same thermal runaway risk.

So EVs and stationary storage have tended to use two different chemistries. But LFP has turned out to be suitable for both. A more stable cathode material gives you a more stable cell, so you can pack cells much more tightly together without the risk of thermal runaway propagating through the battery pack. That means you can put LFP cells into electric vehicles if you do it the right way. What you can’t do is use high-nickel materials in stationary storage systems. They’re very, very big batteries, and if you have a lot of instability within the cells, you end up with fires.

So as EV demand has softened, the automotive industry, which had already invested in cell manufacturing facilities, has decided to go after the stationary storage market, move away from high-nickel chemistries, and start manufacturing LFP cells for stationary storage systems.

There’s been a bit of a push-pull between EV demand and the incentives under the last administration. When those were canceled, billions of dollars had already been invested in cell manufacturing facilities, and the automotive industry said, we’re not going to walk away from that. We want to retain the skills, because we know the EV industry will come back at some point. So in the meantime, they’re making LFP and supplying the stationary storage market, which has kept the cell plants running and the skills in place. That, in a nutshell, is what’s happened. Everything in the battery industry is complex, even the relationships between governments and technology.

GP: That sets up my next question nicely. How do allies like Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia fit into a non-Chinese battery supply chain? Is a fully domestic supply chain the right goal, or is friend-shoring more realistic?

IS: The way China funds its industry, return on investment and profit are not the highest priority. Domination of a market sector, and control, is. We have a very different economic outlook in the West. We rely on a certain amount of public funding to encourage companies to set up in certain locations, but the vast majority of the money is private investment looking for a return.

Because we’re constrained by needing to provide value for taxpayers’ money, we can’t just throw money at it like the Chinese. And because we need private investment, no single country can afford to be the only line of competition against the Chinese manufacturers. We have to spread this around. For the United States to go for a 100% domestic supply chain would be very difficult, given the time it takes to raise the money and get those businesses into profit.

So access to raw materials is key. Australia has the biggest lithium reserves in the world, South America is close behind, and there are pockets of lithium in Europe. What we really need to focus on is making sure the United States works with allied countries to get access to those materials, and that we become the buyer of choice. If we can use more of these materials domestically, we’ve won half the battle.

We’ve talked about cathode materials. The other side of the cell is the anode, which is graphite. There are two ways to put graphite into a cell. You can use natural flake graphite, which you dig out of the ground. There are reserves in Canada, for example, and Nouveau Monde Graphite is a really good example there. But the vast majority of anode material is synthetic graphite, made from needle coke. Needle coke comes from the bottom of the fractional distillation process in oil refining, and some of the best sources are in the UK and the United States. So we already have that raw material on our doorstep. We just have to find the wherewithal to raise the money for anode production in the West. Do that, and you’ve pretty much friend-shored the whole lot. The overall concept is you need an end-to-end supply chain with friendly nations. If any part of it loops through China, it’s going to be difficult.

GP: Pivoting back to U.S. domestic politics: clean energy incentives have shifted significantly with recent changes in administration. How does a company like Western CAM build a long-term manufacturing business when the policy environment can change every few years?

IS: We have to think about the long-term trends. I think the electrification of transport is inevitable. If you look at the physics and the efficiencies involved, you would never buy an internal combustion engine car again if you cared about doing things cost-effectively.

The great thing about where we’ve chosen to be is what we’ve already talked about: EVs softening off and stationary storage coming to the fore. Our LFP cathode material at Western CAM serves both of those markets. Generally, when one is up, the other tends to be down, so it evens out. Regardless of what future administrations do on EVs, at some point they’ll have to back them, because it’s going to be the only way to get around. Whether EVs are up or down, we already have the stationary storage market to go after, and fundamentally it’s exactly the same material going into both markets. So we have a natural hedge.

GP: Earlier this year, the U.S.-China trade truce saw China agree to suspend export controls on rare earths and related technology for at least a year. Do temporary truces like this make investors feel less urgency about funding domestic alternatives, or do they change their perspective?

IS: It doesn’t really affect us much, because we don’t use any rare earths in our material. It’s lithium, iron, phosphate, oxygen, and a bit of additive. So our supply chain stability is pretty much unaffected by those restrictions and pauses.

Where it might affect us is further down the industrial chain. If you can’t make electric motors, you won’t have EVs. And if you can’t get hold of the rare earths that go into some of the electronic circuitry, stationary storage will be a bit of a challenge. So it affects us by association, and investor sentiment depends on whether those restrictions are real, postponed, or brought forward.

It does affect us on the anode side, because China requires export licenses for anode material, both the synthetic and natural graphite we talked about earlier. But that affects cell manufacturing plants more than it affects the supply of our material. So by association we are affected, and it may affect investment sentiment.

I think the biggest risk at the moment is political instability within the United States itself. Domestic policy flips and changes in the United States have a far bigger impact than restrictions coming out of China. The more China restricts these materials and technologies, the more it incentivizes the rest of the world to develop its own sources. So that’s actually a benefit to us.

GP: Can you walk us through your thought process when pitching Western CAM to investors, and to lobbyists or politicians? Why Western CAM? How do you frame it so that an investor wants to put money in? Is it a national security case, a long-term investment with a high ROI? What’s your framework for different audiences?

IS: It’s a combination of things, really. First, return on investment. The financial model shows we can give investors a good return. It’s not like software, where you invest a couple of million dollars one week and get a billion back a couple of years later. It’s not that kind of return. So we try to be as selective as we can and talk to people who understand manufacturing: investors who already have experience making things or supplying products into a marketplace.

Security of supply is important, definitely. But so is the economic advantage and the multiplier effect you get from having these materials made domestically. Earlier in this interview, we said you need an end-to-end supply chain for it to work properly. Unless you have the active materials made domestically, the United States is never going to have control of its battery industry, and it needs that. It needs sovereignty over it. As long as someone else can turn off the tap on material supply, the $4 billion factory you’ve just built to make cells can suddenly grind to a halt and collapse.

So it’s not just about national security. It’s about having a genuinely competitive industry that can withstand shifts in geopolitics around the world. As geopolitics get worse, you need more resilience in your important supply chains, and national security is part of that. If it’s not made here, it needs to be made here. And as an investor, you’re going to give us money and expect more back at some point, and we have a financial model that demonstrates that.

There’s also technical autonomy. The West hasn’t been scaling these materials successfully for the last 15 years. If we want to move into next-generation materials in the future, we’d better have an industry that can make them. Right now, a lot of money is going into materials research, and when something comes out of the lab, people turn around and say, right, who’s going to scale this for us? And there’s nobody there, because the industry doesn’t exist in the West today. We have to fix that problem. The way we see it, we’re an enabler on multiple fronts.

GP: If the United States doesn’t build a domestic battery materials industry in the next decade, what do you foresee the consequences being? What would the warning signs be? And what would you tell people to draw their attention to the importance of energy independence?

IS: If you don’t build an end-to-end battery supply chain, whether through friend-shoring or ally-shoring some of the components, and make sure you have autonomy in your industry, then everything that depends on batteries could at some point be restricted. That’s everything from stationary energy storage systems backing up the grid to AI data centers. Do you really want somebody else to have the ability to turn that supply off?

Then there are electric vehicles. You will have no automotive industry. I know a lot of the defensive policies at the moment are designed to protect the U.S. automotive industry by saying we don’t want EVs, we want internal combustion engine vehicles. That won’t last forever. If you don’t have the capability and industrial capacity to build electric vehicles in the future, you won’t have an automotive industry.

The other element is that batteries are especially important for defense applications. They’re becoming threaded all the way through our economies. If you don’t have control over the part that gives you autonomy, you have no control over your economic future. It really is that critical, in my view.

GP: Those are all the questions I had. Is there anything I didn’t ask that you’d like to cover?

IS: I think recycling. At the end of the day, the more dependent we are on fossil fuels, the worse it’s going to be, planet-wide. The United States is the largest emitter in the world, so something needs to be done about that by somebody at some point. But there’s also the question of how sustainable the supply chain supporting the battery industry is, and that’s improving all the time.

If we can recover materials and put them back into new applications, that’s the best thing we could possibly do, because we stop having to dig mines and build big refineries in our territories. The problem with recycling is that without the missing middle, the active materials, you can recover those materials from old batteries, but at the moment you end up sending them all the way back to China to be made into active materials, because that’s where the capacity is. So the whole circular economy piece completely falls over right now, because there’s no active materials production in the United States. If you want to build a recycling industry, you’d better hope we have an end-to-end manufacturing industry for these materials. Otherwise, recycling is completely pointless.

Topic: American Politics, China-Japan, U.S.-China, U.S.-China Tech Competition