The Battle for the Copperbelt

The U.S.-China Rivalry in Africa’s Corridor Development
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Boys walk past a station and railway building under construction by Chinese workers, part of a development aid project by China in Angola in exchange for petroleum. 2011. Source.

A fragmenting world economy has raised the strategic value of transition minerals and shifted geopolitical chokepoints upstream, towards the mines and logistics corridors of the Global South. This shift is especially visible in Africa’s Central Copperbelt, where growing U.S.–China competition over critical minerals and infrastructure is reshaping the region’s connections to global markets. While great-power competition is often framed as a zero-sum story, in which securing one’s own supply means denying access to rivals, competition need not harden into rivalry. Where commercial interests remain intertwined and African countries’ development priorities provide common ground, triangular cooperation between the great powers and African partners can transcend the zero-sum logic that often prevails at the institutional level. Yet this possibility depends on more than the willingness of external powers to engage in coopetition. It also requires African agency to be actively exercised: above all, the capacity of host states to leverage external competition, negotiate across competing partnerships, sustain collective action and translate strategic mineral interests into domestic productive capabilities.

The Scramble for Critical Minerals

In January 2024, Ivanhoe Mines announced that the first shipment of copper concentrate from the Kamoa-Kakula Copper Complex had arrived by rail at the Atlantic Ocean port of Lobito, Angola. The shipment marked an important milestone in the development of the Lobito Corridor, linking one of the world’s major copper-producing regions to global markets through a revived transcontinental rail connection.

Located in the Central African Copperbelt, a geological formation spanning the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, the Kamoa-Kakula Copper Complex is part of a mineral-rich region that reportedly accounts for more than 10 percent of global copper resources. But copper is far from the only strategic resource found here. The Copperbelt is also rich in cobalt and other critical minerals. Cobalt, for instance, is produced largely as a byproduct of copper mining and is a critical input for batteries used in electric vehicles and electronic devices.

Globally, across different scenarios, copper demand is projected to exceed 40 million tons per year within the next two decades—around 50 percent above current levels—driven by continued economic transformation in Asia, rising Western spending on defense and national security, and new structural demand generated by the global energy and digital transitions. The energy transition alone is creating a substantial new source of copper demand.

Electric vehicles (EVs), for example, are projected to increase copper consumption from around 1.7 million to 4.3 million tons per year by 2035, implying annual growth of roughly 10 percent—as each EV contains up to four times more copper than a conventional car. Demand comes not only from vehicle manufacturing, but also from charging infrastructure, electricity networks, and power systems. More broadly, the shift toward renewable energy infrastructure is expected to require roughly two million additional tons of copper supply per year over the next decade—cementing copper’s role at the heart of the global energy transition.

The digital transition is creating another rapidly expanding source of demand. The explosive growth of artificial intelligence (AI) and data centers is generating substantial additional requirements for copper, both within facilities and across the electricity grids that power them. Data centers are highly electricity-intensive and require large quantities of copper for power distribution, cooling, and IT infrastructure. A conventional data center may use between 5,000 and 15,000 tons of copper, while a hyperscale facility designed to support AI workloads can require up to 50,000 tons per facility, according to the Copper Development Association.

This growing demand is turning copper into a critical strategic commodity, formally recognized as such by both Washington and Brussels. In 2025, copper was added to the U.S. Geological Survey’s list of critical minerals as the Trump administration expanded the scope of minerals considered vital to U.S. interests. The EU moved earlier. Its Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed in March 2023 and entering into force on May 23, 2024, established a two-tier system: a broad list of 34 critical raw materials and a narrower group of 17 strategic raw materials subject to binding EU-wide targets. Copper is included on the strategic list alongside lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths.

Nevertheless, global copper supply is increasingly struggling to keep pace with demand, with the mismatch already becoming visible. The International Copper Study Group projects that the market will shift from a 178,000-ton surplus in 2025 to a 150,000-ton deficit in 2026, as refined production growth slows to below 1 percent while mine output remains difficult to expand. Over the medium to long term, S&P Global projects that global copper production could peak at around 33 million tons in 2030. Unless significant adjustments are made, the resulting supply gap could reach 10 million tons by 2040—around 25 percent below projected demand.

As the market moves toward a deficit, access to existing reserves is becoming increasingly strategic: a new copper mine takes seven to ten years on average to reach production, while permitting alone can consume a substantial share of that timeline. Therefore, this is not a cyclical shortfall, but a structural constraint on supply. For major powers facing this mismatch, securing access to copper abroad is becoming not an option, but a strategic necessity. The scramble for copper is consequently extending beyond mines themselves to the infrastructure needed to move minerals from resource-rich regions to global markets. Railways, ports, power systems, and development corridors are increasingly becoming part of the geopolitical infrastructure underpinning critical-mineral supply.

Facilitate Corridor Access — A ‘Western’ Route

Since the Copperbelt is entirely landlocked, its mining exports have historically depended on a network of long-distance overland corridors, mainly running south and east toward the Indian Ocean, with much of the freight transported by road. The most established and heavily used artery—the Durban Route—requires trucks to travel more than 2,000 kilometers south from the DRC and Zambia, through Zimbabwe or Botswana, before reaching South Africa’s Port of Durban. These conventional routes carry real costs of their own. Aging and poorly maintained infrastructure, steep transit fees, and processing delays routinely push transit times out to 20–45 days. Security compounds the problem: copper shipments are exposed to a heightened risk of hijacking, and violence associated with South Africa’s All Truck Drivers Forum—a group known for targeting foreign drivers—has reportedly discouraged some mining firms from using the corridor at all.

It is against this backdrop that the Lobito Corridor offers a strikingly different option. In 2023, the EU and United States, together with Angola, the DRC, Zambia, the AfDB, and the AFC, signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding to develop the corridor, establishing a new westward pathway for the region’s minerals, as part of the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. At its center is the recently refurbished 1,300-kilometer Benguela Railway, linking the southern DRC to the port of Lobito in Angola, alongside plans to construct a new 800-kilometer railway through northwestern Zambia.

The refurbished railway offers the shortest and most direct route from DRC’s Copperbelt mining district to the Atlantic coast and is now operational. A trial shipment from Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula Copper Complex demonstrated the corridor’s potential to establish a new logistics model, cutting mine-to-sea transit times to around 8–10 days—40–80 percent faster than traditional routes. The corridor has also shown notable operational resilience: when flooding disrupted the region in April 2026, rail services resumed within 48 hours, while traditional road routes were severely disrupted.

The operator, Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR), is a European-backed joint venture between Swiss commodity trader Trafigura (49.5%), Portuguese infrastructure firm Mota-Engil (49.5%), and Belgian independent rail operator Vecturis (1%). In 2022, the consortium won a tender launched by Angola’s Ministry of Transport, beating competing proposals from Chinese entities that had previously rebuilt and financed the historic Benguela railway. The winning consortium secured a 30-year concession to operate and maintain the railway, with an option to extend it by a further 20 years conditional on the construction of a new branch line estimated to cost around US$1 billion.

Kamoa-Kakula—a joint venture between Ivanhoe Mines, Zijin Mining Group, and the Government of the DRC—has emerged as both the corridor’s first and most committed customer. Following the 2024 trial shipment, it signed a reserve-capacity agreement with Trafigura for a minimum six-year term, committing to transport 120,000–240,000 tons of minerals annually via the Lobito Atlantic Railway. By the end of 2026 the corridor is expected to transport approximately 400,000 tons of cargo, putting it on track to reach its target of 1 million tons per annum by the end of the decade.

Yet Lobito’s ambition extends well beyond moving minerals to the coast. EU and U.S. actors are supporting a broader package of initiatives around the corridor, including coordinated strategies for agricultural development and investment in complementary infrastructure, seeking to transform what was once simply a railway to the coast into a wider development corridor. This ambition has brought together an increasingly diverse financing network, including the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Afreximbank, the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), USAID, and the World Bank.

Decoupling from China, or Turning East?

However, to date, not much of the Western commitment to these broader initiatives has translated into actual disbursement. EU- and U.S.-backed business activities and programs remain limited in number and relatively small in scale. In other words, beyond the Benguela Railway and mineral exports, the broader development of the Lobito Corridor is still, to some extent, up in the air. By contrast, on the other side of the Central Copperbelt, China has been actively facilitating a different corridor under its Belt and Road Initiative—the “TAZARA Prosperity Corridor”—while helping to expand Zambia’s export access to the Indian Ocean through the upgrading of the TAZARA railway, connecting central Zambia with the major port of Dar es Salaam in eastern Tanzania.

Originally built in the 1970s with Chinese aid as a symbolic project of China–Africa engagement, the TAZARA Railway has deteriorated significantly in recent decades, with frequent safety incidents and revenues insufficient to cover its high operating costs. Freight volumes fell from a peak of 1.2 million tons in 1986/87 to just 88,000 tons in 2014/15—a 93% decline and less than 2% of TAZARA’s stated 5 million tons per year (MT/year) design capacity. Road transport consequently became the dominant mode for moving cargo to the port of Dar es Salaam: in 2018, trucks carried 38 million tons of national cargo, compared with just 1.07 million tons by rail. After years of wear and tear, TAZARA’s revitalization returned to the governments’ agenda in the mid-2010s. Following several rounds of negotiations, Tanzania, Zambia, and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding at the 2024 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), with China committing US$1.4 billion to upgrade the railway under a 30-year concession.

The concession was awarded to China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), the Chinese state-owned construction enterprise that originally built TAZARA in the 1970s. The proposed 30-year concession includes three years of construction and rehabilitation, followed by 27 years of full operational management. More recently, a joint investment arrangement has been announced for the revitalization project, bringing together Zijin Mining, which holds a 39.6% stake in Kamoa-Kakula, and CMOC, which operates the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines, together accounting for approximately 20% of DRC copper exports in 2025, alongside Jiayou International Logistics and COSCO Shipping. Each of these four companies is set to hold a 5% stake in the rail concession, with CCECC retaining 80%. Of CCECC’s share, roughly 20% is expected to come from the company itself, with the remainder financed through syndicated loans from the China Development Bank, China Exim Bank, Bank of China, and Industrial andCommercial Bank of China.[i]

With the objective of strengthening trade, improving mining logistics, and reducing transportation costs along an alternative route to the Indian Ocean, the development of the TAZARA Corridor has acquired considerable geopolitical salience. Yet this salience may stem less from any deliberate attempt to rival the Lobito Corridor than from TAZARA’s geographical coincidence with the Central Copperbelt, precisely at a moment when critical minerals have moved to the center of both powers’ strategic calculus. Nevertheless, geopolitical narratives have been pervasive from the outset. The U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor and the China-built TAZARA Corridor are increasingly framed as manifestations of a broader competition between major powers over transport routes and critical minerals, while also reflecting a growing recognition of Africa’s strategic importance to the global twin transition.

For decades, U.S. engagement in Africa has centered on security cooperation, development assistance, diplomatic engagement, and support for good governance and public health, with comparatively limited commercial involvement. The Lobito Corridor therefore marks a notable shift in the character of U.S. engagement with the continent—toward a more explicitly commercial and strategically motivated presence. The United States and its partners are betting that the westward corridor will attract sufficient users to become economically viable while catalyzing additional investment and economic activity along its route. China, by contrast, has foregrounded economic engagement with Africa since the beginning of the 21st century, particularly through the agenda of infrastructure development, trade, and manufacturing investment.

Chinese contractors have now become leading players in Africa’s construction market, accounting for more than half of the market by revenue. In the mineral sector, China has also established a dominant presence across both upstream extraction and downstream processing. The DRC, the world’s largest cobalt producer, illustrates this dominance: of its 33 cobalt exporters, 24 are Chinese, including eight farm-in deals and 14 joint ventures with local stakeholders. Downstream, China was the world’s largest refined copper producer in 2024, producing 12.4 Mt—around 45% of global output. In other words, regardless of which export route is used, China remains deeply embedded in the copper trade from the Central African region, including both Zambia and the DRC, and is a major destination for the region’s copper exports. In this respect, it may be almost unlikely for the U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor to achieve commercial viability without some form of Chinese engagement along the value chain.

In fact, the apparent divide between the two corridors becomes considerably less clear when their corporate networks are examined more closely. One of the major stakeholders in the Lobito Atlantic Railway, Mota-Engil, counts China’s leading contractor, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), as its second-largest shareholder. Meanwhile, Zijin Mining, an equity holder in the “Chinese” TAZARA Corridor, also holds a stake in the joint venture that has become Lobito’s first—and so far largest—committed customer. The first train operated by the Lobito Atlantic Railway, for instance, arrived from the DRC carrying copper concentrate destined for China.

The irony, then, is that corridors increasingly portrayed as competing geopolitical projects are commercially intertwined with the very same Chinese firms, capital, and mineral markets that underpin the region’s existing economic geography. The emerging corridor competition may therefore be less a straightforward contest between separate U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence than a more nuanced process of everyday negotiation, bargaining, and commercial calculations.

Critical for Whom? Local Agency and Competition for the Development

Nevertheless, the United States, EU, and China are not, and should not be, the only important stakeholders here. The dense web of interests surrounding the Central African Copperbelt also includes local governments and business elites, many of whom see the current era of globalization and geopolitical transition as an opportunity for investment and development. Despite the partial privatization of the mining sector in the DRC and Zambia during the 1990s, state-owned enterprises have remained important local actors, partnering with foreign investors to capture resource rents. In the DRC, Gécamines has participated in major joint ventures with Chinese investors, including Sicomines, Kamoa-Kakula, and Tenke Fungurume; in Zambia, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) has similarly remained a key domestic stakeholder, including through partnerships around the Chambishi Copper Mine.

At the same time, Africa’s mineral policy agenda is shifting from extraction toward beneficiation and local value addition. Political leaders increasingly argue that exporting raw minerals while importing higher-value industrial goods reproduces structural dependency. The African Union’s African Mining Vision has therefore called for closer integration of mining with industrial policy, while the African Development Bank has promoted mineral-based industrialization as a pathway toward structural transformation. Downstream processing—particularly local refining and manufacturing—has consequently emerged as an area of convergence between African policymakers seeking to retain more value domestically and Western partners seeking to diversify refining capacity away from China and de-risk critical-mineral supply chains.

This convergence has created new room for policy collaboration. In 2018, the DRC declared cobalt a strategic mineral, while Zambia launched an aggressive expansion of mining and exploration in 2021. Both governments increasingly view the mineral sector not simply as a source of export revenues, but as a potential platform for industrialization, energy investment, and broader economic transformation. The 2022 trilateral memorandum of understanding between the DRC, Zambia, and the U.S. government to develop an integrated EV-battery value chain—from mineral extraction to battery assembly—was an important expression of this ambition. The EU has likewise established strategic partnerships with both countries around critical-mineral value chains. Zambia has also explored domestic EV-battery production in partnership with Chinese firms, illustrating how local governments have endeavored to engage multiple external partners rather than simply choosing between competing geopolitical camps.

Hence, great-power competition has indeed opened a valuable window of opportunity for African mineral states. As the United States, China, and Europe compete for access to critical minerals and influence over associated supply chains, African governments have potentially greater bargaining power to negotiate investment conditions, local-content requirements, infrastructure commitments, and downstream processing. For development partners that have long advocated structural transformation on the continent, this competition may similarly provide greater leverage to push foreign investment toward broader development objectives.

But this leverage should not be overstated. Significant constraints remain, including conflicting interests within regional politics and weak coordination across levels of government. Zimbabwe’s use of local-content requirements to encourage Chinese investment in lithium processing demonstrates what more assertive policy intervention can achieve but also highlights the importance of institutional capacity and market conditions. The DRC and Zambia may face distinct political, institutional, and industrial contexts, meaning that there is no single model for translating mineral wealth into stronger bargaining power.

Moreover, turning policy ambitions into industrial capabilities is far from straightforward. Downstream development requires substantial investment in transport, electricity, and processing infrastructure, as well as the technical capabilities local firms need to meet global standards. It also requires governments and businesses to navigate local interests and engage with communities whose livelihoods and territories are directly affected by mineral development. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to attract more capital, but to shape how different forms of capital are embedded in domestic economies and contribute to local productive transformation.

Ultimately, the critical question is not simply who controls critical minerals, but who can shape what their extraction produces. The current geopolitical scramble may give African states greater room to maneuver, but meaningful agency depends on their ability to coordinate across governments, firms, and communities, and to convert external competition into domestic capabilities. At the same time, these spaces of transformation could become a practical platform for great-power engagement on the ground. Indeed, local development priorities may create areas in which the United States, China, and other external partners are compelled—or incentivized—to cooperate, whether voluntarily or by the practical demands of working in the same spaces and value chains. In this sense, African agency may lie not only in choosing between competing powers, but in leveraging their competition to create new grounds for cooperation and peace.

Endnote

[i] Interview with CCECC General Manager on operation of TAZARA Railway, June 2026.

Jing Zhang is Research Associate at the Centre for Sustainable Structural Transformation (CSST) at SOAS University of London

Topic: Belt and Road Initiative, China-Africa, Chinese Foreign Policy, U.S.-China