The Rigorous Pragmatism of Chinese-Syrian Relations

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024 forced Beijing to reassess its Syria policy from the ground up. For over a decade, China’s engagement with Damascus rested on predictable interactions with Assad’s close circle, habitual diplomatic choreography, and the reputational wager of shielding the regime at the UN Security Council. When President Ahmed al-Sharaa assumed power, those foundations dissolved overnight. Yet, the political rupture also opened an opportunity; Beijing could construct a new approach untethered from the rigid loyalties and ideological narratives that had long distorted its relationship with Syria.

Before the Fall

China’s Syria policy has long struggled to accept the Syrian civil war’s revolutionary struggle to overthrow Assad. Uniquely, China’s own revolutionary history for a certain generation of Chinese policymakers could create some semblance of shared struggle with the Syrian people following the 2011 uprisings. However, two primary challenges have relentlessly pushed Beijing to embrace the Assad government, despite the overwhelming liability he introduced to China’s foreign policy and international image: one, the refusal to allow any more western-backed regime change in the region (and thus to slow the process of the Arab Spring) and, two, the later emergence of terrorist actors China perceived a threat to its core interests.

In 2011, Beijing begrudgingly abstained in UN Security Council resolution 1973 opening the door for NATO-led military intervention in Libya to blunt ongoing violence by Muammar Ghaddafi at the behest of the Arab League and African Union, two regional organizations whose opinions Chinese officials found important. NATO-led intervention ultimately enabled the overthrow of Ghaddafi, and the resulting collapse of Libyan security forced China to undertake its largest non-combatant evacuation of Chinese citizens–an estimated 35,000–from Libya. China’s economic losses totaled an estimated $20 billion. For many Chinese leaders involved in trying to resolve the Libya crisis, Libya was a watershed moment, especially for then Vice President Xi Jinping. Xi, who assumed power in 2013, would later draw an unequivocal line in the sand on any further regime change as the result of western intervention in the Arab Spring. Syria would be Beijing’s last stand on this issue.

When the Syrian war broke out, China vetoed, often in tandem with Russia, any UN resolution which it perceived as a threat to the stability of the Syrian regime. This included shielding Assad from calls for regime change, both internally and externally, but also blocking Arab League efforts to sanction the Syrian leader. Saudi Arabia resigned its position in the UN Security Council in protest to persistent UNSC failures to intervene in the Syrian crisis, particularly China and Russia’s persistent UN vetoes. This pattern persisted for several years, until Beijing had sufficient reassurance of Assad’s stability.

In the early years of the Syrian war, despite China’s veto and devout position on regime protection, Beijing attempted to engage with factions of the political opposition it saw as reconcilable to a dialogue with the Assad government. These efforts however produced little to no progress. Eventually, China’s sense of security in Syria was reinforced when Russia entered the war to help Assad recapture territory from the kaleidoscope of militias and opposition forces struggling for a piece of Syria. By this period, Syria had become a staging ground for major UN registered terrorist groups like the early iteration of the Al-Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and the Islamic State (ISIS) to capture large swaths of Syria and attract thousands of foreign fighters. ISIS’s particular brand of brutality ultimately dragged U.S. coalition forces into Syria and Iraq to fight them.

To China’s dismay, among the flow of foreign fighters entering Syria, Chinese militants linked to the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Turkistani Islamic Party (TIP) later entered Syria and set up operations. Meanwhile, smaller number of Chinese militants joined ISIS, and directly threatened attacks against China. For China, Syria became a major counterterrorism priority, and Beijing leaned on its ties with the Syrian government and Russia as core counterterrorism partners in Syria. In many parts of Syria, intensive international efforts to defeat ISIS forced many of its fighters to the Syrian desert. HTS disaffiliated with Al-Qaeda and shifted from simply a fighting force to a governing one, after securing and maintaining control of parts of Northwest Syria. ETIM and TIP-linked fighters were among a range of groups tacitly integrated into HTS’s coalition of armed actors. Despite the efforts of Beijing’s coalition with the Assad government, in late November 2024, HTS and a network of opposition groups, together with ETIM and TIP fighters, overthrew Assad and recaptured Damascus.

Within a matter of days, China’s long-term effort to stabilize the Assad government, its primary “counterterrorism” partner, collapsed, and its leader fled to Moscow. Russia offered little resistance when HTS quietly proposed that Moscow let Assad fall, following years of growing Russian frustration with the Assad government. In the end, Beijing was completely focused on pushing back against western hegemony that it overlooked the possibility that an internal revolution could overthrow a horrific leader, one it had made its primary counterterrorism partner, a partner which used brutal tactics, starvation, and torture to try to maintain control of a fractured country.

In retrospect, one of the more uncomfortable truths for both sides is that China’s posture during the civil war—its repeated vetoes, its insistence on sovereignty language, its alignment with Russia’s protective diplomacy—contributed to foreclosing the possibility that Syrians might, as Mao put it, “stand up” against their regime and remake their political system. Beijing’s protection of Assad did not only slow diplomatic pressure on his regime; it helped prevent any scenario where the regime could fall. And, ultimately, it was Russia’s decision to finally let go of Assad under pressure from an HTS-led military campaign which left China’s Syria policy in shambles.

After the Fall

After the fall of Assad, Chinese foreign policy grew more pragmatic. Both sides showed a rigorous commitment to finding a way to work through their core problems. Since early 2025, the emerging relationship has been shaped by a shared logic of “maintaining low ambitions while seeking greater clarity” and giving each other what Wang Yi has described elsewhere as a “2 meter alley.” China stripped away the rhetoric that previously inflated its Syria partnership and now speaks openly and plainly of its expectations. Bilateral discussions now revolve around specific deliverables, narrow risk tolerance, and a disciplined effort to identify the smallest workable common ground. This rigorous pragmatism has proven unexpectedly productive, largely because neither side is burdened by illusions about what the other can provide.

After Assad’s fall, Chinese leadership approached its public posture toward Syria with deliberate caution and quiet recalibration. Its embassy staff evacuated to Lebanon and many Chinese nationals fled the country. On February 21, only ten weeks after Assad’s collapse, Chinese Ambassador Shi Hongwei met with Syrian President Ahmed Shara’a in Damascus for the first on-record bilateral dialogue since Shara’a assumed control of the country with the hopes of assessing the positions of both sides. The meeting opened the door for a more deliberate process in Damascus to build a floor under the relationship. In May, Chinese authorities dispatched Chen Weiqing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of the West Asia and North Africa department, to meet with President Shara’a to discuss the ongoing political transition, potential economic opportunities, and, most importantly, China’s counterterrorism concerns. This engagement also overlapped a Chinese commercial delegation scouting post-conflict Syria for potential investment opportunities. Chinese officials, often led by Ambassador Shi Hongwei, visited Damascus at least four more times before Syrian Foreign Minister Shaibani announce his intention to visit Beijing.

The Damascus dialogue was also parallel to a political process in New York at the United Nations by China’s mission seeking to organize sufficient diplomatic pressure to push Syrian authorities to comply with China’s demands on Syria’s counterterrorism requirements. In China’s view, Syrian authorities must comply with its requirements to remove registered terrorist actors (in China’s case, TIP and ETIM fighters) who were promoted by Syrian authorities into Syria’s new Ministry of Defense. Beijing protested their integration and raised their concerns in the UN Security Counci. Yet, even here, China’s rhetoric in the UN Security Council struck a balanced, but forceful tone on this point. In one statement, China’s UN representative Fu Cong articulated that any participation of China in Syria’s reconstruction would hinge on Syria’s counterterrorism compliance.

Both processes converged in a major UN vote to lift sanctions on Syria’s president in November. China faced a similar moment of exclusion as 2011. One potential explanation for China’s harder line in the UN ahead of the vote appeared to stem partly from a lack of U.S. consensus on the importance of China’s demands. The United States was pushing a UN resolution to lift sanctions, but China largely cautioned against it until receiving more suitable guarantees from Syrian authorities regarding ETIM and TIP. This created a narrow window for China and Syria to reach an understanding—otherwise Beijing would be forced to stand as the sole country vetoing the resolution.

Earlier in the year, China was joined by other international countries concerned by the presence of foreign fighters in Syria. But, by June, the United States reportedly reached an agreement with Syrian authorities to allow foreign fighters to be integrated into the new Ministry of Defense, reversing their previous demand that such fighters leave Syria. Meanwhile, Syria’s leaders held productive dialogues in Moscow, which helped Syria secure Russian support for lifting UN sanctions. China remained the last holdout for a resolution to lift UN sanctions on the Syrian president.

It seemed Beijing was outmaneuvered at the UN as the United States pushed through the resolution, forcing Beijing to either become the sole vetoing power or stand down. Beijing abstained, with Ambassador Cong expressing his disappointment in the U.S. resolution: “China expresses its regret about this.”

Pragmatism Wins

On the backside of the resolution vote, Syrian authorities had achieved two major milestones. First, UN sanctions on President Sharaa were lifted, which enabled President Sharaa to visit Washington, where he met with President Trump and secured six months of sanctions relief. Second, rather than taking a victory lap, Syria’s Foreign Minister visited Beijing for high-level meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi days later.

The Beijing meeting resulted in positive movement in bilateral ties and high-level engagement to address comprehensive relations. Wang Yi expressed China’s desire to “recalibrate the course of China-Syria relations and bring bilateral relations back on track.” Syria’s leadership reaffirmed their support for the one-China policy and pledged not to allow any entity to use Syrian territory to undermine Chinese interests. This commitment, Wang noted, would “remove security obstacles to the sound and steady development of China-Syria relations.”

Wang also welcomed Syria’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and expressed China’s readiness to consider participating in Syria’s reconstruction. Among all the offers Wang made, he consistently reinforced the imperative of ensuring development and security occurred in a “coordinated manner.” Ultimately, Beijing was seeking assurances that Syria would follow through on its commitments. If it did, China would be willing to help rebuild.

It is not an easy diplomatic feat to engage in tenuous dialogue with China, especially on Beijing’s most sensitive issues. For Syrian authorities, addressing China’s counterterrorism concerns required more than symbolic gestures. This included dealing with the difficult reality of Uyghur militant groups incorporated into Syria’s new Ministry of Defense. Damascus had to absorb criticism, make concrete commitments, and prioritize sustained dialogue over diplomatic theater. The approach demonstrated that pragmatism rooted in realist foreign policy could navigate even the most sensitive pressure points with a major power. Whether these commitments prove sufficient remains to be seen, but the approach itself represents a more workable foundation than either side has had in over a decade.

Lesson for Managing China’s Red Lines

The arc of Sino-Syrian relations since Assad’s fall underscores how rigorous pragmatism can work by stripping away the performative elements that can distort diplomatic ties. Both sides have a long way to go before reaching a final agreement. China’s shift from ideological patron to transactional partner became possible only after the collapse forced both sides to abandon the pretense that their relationship was built on shared values or strategic alignment.

What emerged for both was a framework of expectations, narrow deliverables, and mutual acknowledgment of limited trust. Damascus succeeded by treating China’s counterterrorism concerns as serious negotiating constraints rather than rhetorical obstacles. The Syrian approach—absorbing criticism in New York, engaging repeatedly in Damascus, and maintaining parallel dialogues with Moscow and Beijing—demonstrated an understanding that dialogue with China requires showing up consistently, addressing core interests directly, and proving follow-through incrementally. This stands in stark contrast to the Assad-era relationship, where vetoes and sovereignty rhetoric masked the absence of genuine strategic coordination.

Pragmatism creates the conditions under which success becomes measurable. For other states navigating China’s growing influence, Syria’s experience suggests that dispensing with blame and committing to the process of engagement—even amid severe reservations—can prove more productive than abandoning the relationship altogether. Both Beijing and Damascus had ample justification to walk away: China faced the incorporation of groups it designated as terrorists into Syria’s government, while Syria endured public criticism and isolation at the UN. Yet both chose to work through these friction points rather than treat them as insurmountable. The willingness to stay in the process, despite discomfort and uncertainty, created space for incremental progress that premature abandonment would have foreclosed.

For states navigating contentious issues with Beijing, the Syrian case offers several concrete lessons. First, China’s tolerance for diplomatic friction where its national security priorities are concerned. Beijing clearly defined its red lines, and Damascus found more traction with China by addressing these concerns directly than by attempting to deflect or minimize them. Second, Syria’s decision to engage Beijing early, alongside its dialogues with Moscow and Washington, demonstrated Damascus’s commitment to balanced relations and a “no problems” policy with major powers. For China, this meant it could not simply wait out Syria or assume Damascus would prioritize Western relations at Beijing’s expense. Early, sustained engagement forced China to clarify its own terms rather than rely on Syria’s isolation to extract concessions. Third, engagement at multiple levels—embassy presence in Damascus, technical delegations, ministerial visits—signaled the seriousness of both sides in finding a mutual way forward, despite the occasional exchange of strong language.

Syria’s experience suggests that managing relations with China on hard issues requires treating Beijing as a major power with specific interests that demands clear responses when it identifies concerns. Beijing’s experience likewise suggests that partners willing to address Chinese concerns directly, while reinforcing their right to sovereignty and non-interference, provide a more workable framework for managing difficult issues. A mutual consensus on these terms created space for working through harder problems.

Jesse Marks is the founder of Rihla Research & Advisory & Global Critical Minerals Platform.

The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.