The rise of China has come with designations of the present day as a “new Cold War.” Many fear the ideological expansion of China and view the U.S. and China as two poles in an ideological battle, where rivalry is the only lens through which to view the relationship. To understand why these frameworks do not accurately capture the full picture, the Monitor spoke with Jessica Chen Weiss.
Jessica Chen Weiss is the David M. Lampton Professor of China Studies and the inaugural faculty director of the Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs (ACF) at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. From 2021 to 2022, she served as senior advisor to the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured IR Scholars (IAF-TIRS). She was previously the Michael J. Zak Professor of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University and an assistant professor at Yale University. She is the author of Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, August 2014) and the upcoming book What China Wants: And What It Means For the World (Oxford University Press, February 2027).
Vimi Wang: People claiming expertise on China have attempted to articulate ‘what China wants’ as though any country has a single, unified national interest. Your book title suggests that this assumption may be misleading. What is the biggest misconception Americans have when they talk about what China wants?
Jessica Chen Weiss: The biggest misconception is that China has a well-developed plan to dominate the world. This idea comes in a number of different forms, but my argument, as you indicated, is that there are many different voices within China. There are also competing interests that even a leader who has concentrated as much power as Xi Jinping still has to navigate.
These trade-offs involve a number of objectives that are not just his own, but are broadly shared across China, including sovereignty, security, and development. My argument is that these are enduring objectives, but the way Chinese leaders pursue them has varied over time. Those variations do not add up to a coherent drive to dominate the world.
Emma Brignall: On a related note, who’s really steering decisions inside China right now? Xi Jinping, the party, the military, nationalist public opinion, or some combination of all of those, as you just started talking about?
JCW: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a single-party regime that does not face free or competitive national elections. As a result, Xi Jinping certainly has an outsized influence over decision-making—there’s no question about that. However, I think a common assumption is that he is simply pushing buttons and pulling levers behind the scenes. The reality is that governing a country as large and complex as China is much more challenging than that.
In fact, if Xi Jinping were truly omniscient and omnipotent, China would not be facing many of the entrenched problems it struggles with today, whether that’s youth unemployment or broader economic challenges. He would like to wave a magic wand and solve many of these issues, but there are realities that even he has to confront.
VW: Your earlier work focused heavily on nationalism. There’s a line of argumentation from academics and officials in China that the government is keeping an aggressive popular nationalism at bay. Is this true? For example, is popular nationalism keeping Beijing from compromising more with Washington?
JCW: Nationalism is really a double-edged sword. It is something that the government has cultivated, but it also constrains policymaking and puts pressure on leaders. Oftentimes, the leadership makes statements or even adopts policies intended to placate or appease nationalist voices. Of course, the government has allowed those voices to flourish, and that too is a choice. But it can constrain the flexibility that the government has—or perceives that it has.
At the same time, the government has a number of strategies for navigating difficult situations in which public expectations are high and many people believe China should have already resolved certain issues. In those cases, the government often finds itself having to persuade nationalist audiences to be patient—that things are moving in the right direction and that time is on China’s side.
As a result, much of the rhetoric that observers point to as evidence of China’s growing confidence or triumphalism is often directed at domestic audiences. Those audiences are impatient and would like to see China not only receive greater respect internationally, but also become stronger and more successful in advancing what they see as Chinese interests.
EB: I’d also like to ask about your recent publication on the “ideological trap.” Many commentators describe the current U.S.-China relationship as a “new Cold War.” However, in your recent publication, you and Eun A. Jo argue that the current US-China rivalry is more about pursuing paths of ideological divergence than a battle for ideological hegemony. What does this mean for the future of U.S.-China relations? And where do Washington and Beijing differ the most ideologically?
JCW: In this article, we argue that China is not like the Soviet Union, and not even like China under Mao. Since Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued what we call a more particularist ideological strategy—one that favors a world that is safe not only for the CCP, but for many different forms of political and social governance. Under Xi Jinping, this has taken on a more expansive form, with efforts to reshape international norms to accommodate those differences. We call this “expansive particularism.”
The key point is that ideology in China is not static, nor is it the primary driving force in a straightforward way. As I discuss in the book, ideology takes many forms inside China itself. There is even significant domestic criticism from Marxist-leaning groups who argue that the CCP has moved too far away from its roots—becoming too capitalist, suppressing student Marxist groups, and failing to adequately address inequality created by rapid growth.
More broadly, ideology in both China and the United States is continually evolving. Rather than two irreconcilable systems locked in a new Cold War, there may actually be space for coexistence, especially as the United States steps back from a more universal and expansive promotion of democracy abroad.
We also note that some Chinese analysts view recent shifts in U.S. politics—particularly a more nationalist rather than universal approach to human rights—as potentially reassuring. That said, any such détente remains fragile, and could break down if either side interprets the other’s actions as an attempt to export its political model or subvert the other’s system abroad.
VW: It is important to be cautious about simply labeling this a “new Cold War,” especially in a relationship as consequential as the U.S. and China’s. Pivoting to recent developments, following the Trump–Xi summit, what new questions have emerged for U.S.-China relations? And what would you hope to see from Xi’s planned fall visit to the United States?
JCW: The two leaders have signaled an important direction toward stabilizing the relationship. But there is still considerable room for misunderstanding, as well as uncertainty about how exactly both sides will implement and carry forward that shared commitment to a more constructive and stable U.S.-China relationship. One of the most important questions is whether the two countries can exercise mutual restraint in the weaponization of supply chains and what we call “choke points.”
A second related question is whether the two sides—both societies and economies—can ensure that the economic relationship works for a broader set of stakeholders and interests in both countries, rather than being perceived as captured by a narrow set of wealthy business actors. If stabilization is not inclusive, it will be politically vulnerable.
EB: Speaking of the economic side of the summit, do you think there were any positive outcomes from the summit, such as the Boards of Trade and Investment?
JCW: That’s an important area where some of these issues could potentially be addressed through negotiation. We are starting from a fairly low baseline, so there are likely to be areas of non-strategic trade where tariffs could be reduced and trade more openly welcomed. The question of investment flows and the future of direct investment in both directions is potentially a thornier issue.
It will be important to find ways for American industries to benefit from Chinese technology and investment, so long as it is compatible with, or at least neutral toward, the participation of unions and American workers. The goal is for firms to see this not as a threat, but as something that helps them become more competitive rather than being driven out of the industry.
VW: Regarding your book—without giving away too much—what is one policy recommendation you hope policymakers in Washington take from What China Wants, and why is it especially important at this moment in U.S.-China relations?
JCW: The bottom line is that the U.S.-China relationship, and China’s trajectory more broadly, is still very much evolving and interacting with the outside world in ways that we can help shape. Given the domestic tensions, trade-offs, and competing priorities within China, it is important first to take a diagnostic approach: there is often more complexity than is captured by simplistic narratives of a China seeking global hegemony.
Second, the existence of these competing incentives has important implications for deterrence and for preventing conflict. In particular, one of the most important sources of deterrence is the Chinese government’s belief that, through continued modernization and development, many of the issues it faces will eventually be resolved—especially territorial and sovereignty disputes, most notably Taiwan.
For that reason, it is important that the Chinese leadership be able to continue telling domestic audiences that time is on China’s side. That narrative plays a role in reducing pressure for more precipitous action.
EB: Moving to a more general question. Your voice stands out as a moderate one in the sphere of China experts. Washington is particularly hawkish on China at the moment. How do you have honest, meaningful engagement on issues of U.S.-China relations at the moment with people of starkly different viewpoints?
JCW: First, engaging in good faith on the substance of ideas is essential for any policy community that wants to examine its assumptions and refine policy solutions to difficult questions involving real trade-offs and competing interests. That is one of the reasons I moved to Washington—to bring a spirit of rigor and humility, civility, and creativity to the institution I now lead, the Johns Hopkins SAIS Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs. It can be a challenging environment, but I don’t feel isolated or alone in this effort.
I think there is a broad-based, if sometimes latent, interest in a more rigorous conversation about China, U.S. interests in the world, and China’s place in that conversation. I’ve written in Foreign Affairs that the old consensus on China was much shallower and more fragile than it may have appeared. Beneath the surface, there is a real appetite for re-examining assumptions, having debates that are not happening often enough, and working across partisan and other lines to identify a more sound basis for the future.
VW: Looking at future implications, how do we move away from the bilateral consensus that China is always the enemy and the competitor? What are the biggest openings you see for increased collaboration and exchange with China?
JCW: I think this starts with recognizing that the term “competition” is under-specified. Businesses compete, but for states to “compete,” there has to be a clear understanding of where interests are directly at odds—and where reducing the risk of zero-sum or negative-sum outcomes is not possible. In that sense, there is a shared baseline understanding that we should avoid war with China. That is not a dovish or hawkish position—it is a pragmatic one, and it has broad bipartisan support.
Where the framework becomes problematic is when “competition with China” is used as a shorthand for a range of other policy priorities. It can make it harder to acknowledge that even in a competitive relationship, there are areas where coordination or cooperation is still necessary. As a result, the framework can take on zero-sum overtones that are not always helpful.
Some have argued that “strategic competition” is already a somewhat outdated framework—shaped by a particular period beginning in the Trump administration and continuing through the Biden administration. At a more fundamental level, U.S. interests are in flux. If the United States no longer defines global primacy as its central objective, then what exactly it is “competing” with China over becomes less clear, and that opens up space for rethinking the relationship.
Take Taiwan as an example. The U.S. objective is deterrence and maintaining peace and stability—not competing with China over control of Taiwan. If the relationship were framed purely as competition, it would actually increase the risk of war, because it would signal to China that the United States would never accept any peaceful resolution of the issue. This illustrates why the language of competition is both underspecified and potentially dangerous.
EB: Turning to the South China Sea, countries like the Philippines may not be focused on whether China seeks global hegemony, but they may see it as pursuing regional dominance, which is a more immediate concern. How does your argument speak to how these countries should understand China’s intentions? And how does that fit into the broader ideological framework you lay out?
Jessica Chen Weiss: It’s important to be clear that China’s territorial claims are in direct conflict with those of many of its neighbors, including Japan, the Philippines, and India, even if some of those disputes have been managed or de-escalated at times.
But this is not really an argument about whether China seeks regional dominance in an abstract sense. It is about sovereignty claims—claims that Chinese leaders are deeply committed to and have repeatedly signaled they do not intend to relinquish, as reflected in statements like Xi Jinping’s emphasis on not giving up “an inch.”
That is distinct from the ideological domain, where the question is whether China is seeking to export a particular political model, such as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In the territorial and maritime sphere, China’s interests are often directly at odds with those of its neighbors. Importantly, these conflicts are not predetermined to escalate in only one direction. In some cases, states have found ways to manage disputes by shelving differences or pursuing forms of joint development. Whether and where that is possible remains an open question—but it is the space where diplomacy still operates.