Ambassador Togo Kazuhiko: Great Power Relations in Northeast Asia and Challenges to Japan’s Foreign Policy

It is a great honor to have been asked to deliver the keynote address at the Third Asia-Pacific Development Forum: A Jimmy Carter Conversation on Waging Peace. I would like to express my sincere gratitude. I would like to get straight to the main subject.

What concerns me most at present is how the Northeast Asian region, where Japan and its neighboring countries are located, can achieve peaceful and prosperous development. This raises the question of how we should think about our relationship with the United States, the “invisible elephant” in this region.

Today, from this perspective, I would like to discuss five issues.

First, I would like to begin with the United States. But before discussing today’s America, Trump’s America, I would like to refer to the America that preceded it—the America that emerged as the overwhelming victor of the Cold War approximately thirty-five years ago—and discuss why a world in which wars have continued without end emerged from that point.

Second, I will move directly to the present-day Trump 2.0. If we narrow our focus to war and peace, I would first like to discuss America last year, Trump in 2025.

Third, in my impression, Trump changed dramatically after the beginning of this year. I would like to discuss how he has changed and what he may become going forward.

Fourth, when considering the current situation in Northeast Asia, there have been three summits involving the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea beginning in May of this year. I would like to consider what these summits mean.

Finally, I would like to discuss Japan’s diplomacy going forward: the merits and shortcomings of Takaichi government’s foreign policy, and what fundamentals of Japan’s foreign policy are and how they can be upheld. 

1. America Before the Emergence of Trump 2.0

Now, as a first point, when discussing America, we inevitably have to consider how far back in history we should go.

I believe we need to go back at least to the point when the United States won the Cold War in 1989, and in 1991 received the additional reward of the collapse of the Soviet Union, becoming, quite literally, the overwhelmingly dominant empire in the world.

Having become the world’s foremost champion of fundamental universal values—human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and so forth—the United States came to believe that from then on it should organize history according to those values. This way of thinking is collectively referred to as “neoconservatism,” or neocon. Although there were differences among individuals, I believe that most of the next six presidents broadly followed this approach.

Around the world, there were countries that followed America’s leadership and countries that did not. In Europe, the person who rebelled against this was Russia’s Vladimir Putin. At first, he maintained friendly relations with the United States and Europe, but he eventually came into conflict with America for two reasons.

First, at the 2007 NATO summit in Bucharest, the principle of Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO was recognized, prompting President Putin to react strongly against it. Behind this NATO decision was the Republican neocon leader George W. Bush.

Next, in February 2014, pro-Russian and pro-European forces within Ukraine clashed, resulting in what became known as the Maidan Revolution. President Putin argued that “under these circumstances, the identity of Ukrainians who are oriented toward Russia cannot be preserved,” and Crimea was annexed to Russia following a so-called referendum. Behind the Maidan Revolution was Joe Biden, then serving as Obama’s vice president and a neocon, too.

Following Crimea, the issue of protecting ethnic Russian Ukrainians living in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained as the next unresolved challenge. Many people believed that the issue had, at least provisionally, been resolved through the establishment of “special status” areas under the 2015 Minsk Agreements.

The Ukraine issue gradually escalated after Biden became president in January 2021, and in February 2022, it finally exploded into a conflict in the form of Russia’s “special military operation” targeting Donetsk and Luhansk. On the surface, this is fighting between Russia and Ukraine, but Russia views Ukraine as having become a country being made to fight a proxy war on behalf of the United States and Britain.

Now, as a result of America’s overwhelming victory, another source of a hot war was left behind in the Middle East. Initially, there was indeed a historic reconciliation in September 1993, based on the so-called Oslo Accords, mediated by President Clinton, between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). They agreed to five years of interim Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

However, American and British leadership gradually declined from that point onward, while the Palestinian extremist organization Hamas in Gaza steadily expanded its power. In October 2024, amid the intensifying conflict in Ukraine, an unexpected development occurred when Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel and took hostages. In the Middle East, Hezbollah was operating in Lebanon in cooperation with Hamas, while Shiite Iran stood behind both forces. This created a political background in which tensions between Iran and Israel and the United States became increasingly intense. Trump 2.0 thus emerged in January 2025 under these circumstances.

2. Trump 2.0 in 2025: Beginning MAGA as a President Seeking Peace

Let’s now move to the second issue: Trump in 2025.

President Trump’s greatest policy objective was to restore America’s economic power by using tariffs as a weapon, thereby “Making America Great Again” (MAGA). However, his first message concerning “war and peace” appeared in his January 20 inaugural address, in which he stated that he would “build the strongest military in the world,” but that success would be measured by “ending wars and not entering them.” This reflected the direction of a “peace-seeking, peace-oriented president.”

The most prominent example was his pledge, in effect, to “end the futile war in Ukraine as soon as possible.” I believe that, with the aim of becoming a “fair mediator,” Trump genuinely worked seriously on this for an entire year.

As a summary of his activities over that year, the National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in November. My understanding is that it offered the interesting guiding principle that Trump’s role was to reject what the neoconservative presidents had done, resolve the consequences that had arisen from those policies, and act as a “peace-seeking president.”

“The era in which the United States supported the world order has come to an end.” 

“America’s values-based diplomacy has also come to an end.”

In the Western Hemisphere, America will implement a “Trumpian application” of the Monroe Doctrine, which might be called the “Donroe Doctrine.”

Europe has lost its civilizational confidence and is close to suffocating under the introduction of endless regulations. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Europe has become unable to see Russia as anything other than a threat to its very survival.

On the other hand, deterring the expansion of the war in Ukraine, bringing it to an early end, and rebuilding a strategic relationship with Russia are core American interests.

3. Trump 2.0 in 2026: Has He Transformed into a President Overconfident in His Own Omnipotence?

Now I come to the third issue: Trump in 2026.

In the new year, in the early morning of January 3, the U.S. military attacked Venezuela, located at the heart of the Western Hemisphere, and detained the president and his wife. In effect, it appears that the United States has gained control of Venezuela’s enormous oil interests.

Furthermore, on January 4, President Trump reiterated his previously stated intention to acquire Greenland, located in the Arctic Ocean in the Western Hemisphere. For a time, fears that this might escalate into the use of military force spread throughout the world.

On February 28, Trump, acting in coordination with Israel, launched a military attack against Iran and killed Ayatollah Khamenei, successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, who had become Iran’s Supreme Leader following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. He declared that preventing Iran from possessing nuclear weapons was among the objectives of the war.

However, I do not believe it is logical for Trump to attack Iran again with the aim of “completely destroying its capacity to produce nuclear weapons,” after he had already claimed in June 2025 that he had “completely and totally obliterated” three Iranian nuclear facilities using so-called bunker-buster bombs.

If Trump cannot prevent the escalation of the war with Iran and build peace, will Trump 2026 not go down in history as a “war president overconfident in his own omnipotence”?

4. Summit Diplomacy Beginning in May 2026

The U.S.-China Summit: A Turning Point, May 13–15

Now I move to the fourth issue: the three summits in Northeast Asia.

First, there was the U.S.-China summit from May 13 to 15. The Trump side showed a pronounced desire to develop the economic relationship between the two countries going forward.

In terms of political and security issues, reports frequently emerged during the talks that the United States would seek China’s help to bring the war against Iran to an early end. However, there is no reason for China to get involved in a war that has been taken too far. The sensational reporting gradually died down.

On the other hand, what attracted overwhelming interest during Trump’s visit to China was that President Xi Jinping projected China’s current self-perception and fundamental strategy to the world with unmistakable clarity.

At the plenary session on the 14th, Xi Jinping presented a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” as the overall vision for U.S.-China relations. As its foundation, he stated that the two countries must “overcome the Thucydides Trap.”

The “Thucydides Trap” is a theory of international relations holding that when a rising power challenges an existing great power, the result is highly likely to be war. It is obvious that the “existing great power” referred to here is currently the United States and the “rising challenger” is China. Xi Jinping thus directly confronted the United States with the bold self-perception that China will eventually surpass America.

If “overcoming the Thucydides Trap” means “avoiding war with each other,” that is certainly a positive goal. But Xi Jinping immediately raised the Taiwan issue as an essential matter for preventing war, using the most forceful language:

“If the Taiwan issue cannot be handled appropriately, the two countries will confront and clash with each other, pushing China-U.S. relations into an extremely dangerous situation.”

Trump did not make a single public statement (on Taiwan) while in Beijing. He began speaking little by little during an informal press conference aboard Air Force One on his way home from Beijing, but he still appears not to have revealed much. For the time being, his response appears to have been quite successful.

The question now is the depth of Trump’s capabilities.

First, can he prevent himself from being driven by his “sense of omnipotence” toward Iran? On June 17, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding under which they would first reopen the Strait of Hormuz and then, at the next stage, consider concrete measures for the denuclearization of Iran. This included considerable concessions on the American side. To me, these appear to be courageous concessions. The situation seems to be becoming confused again, but I would like to wait and see a little longer.

Second, it is now of utmost importance that Trump has a firm grasp of the Taiwan issue because Xi Jinping approaches it as the largest and most important issue in his dealings with Trump.  If this issue is handled well, the dialogue between the United States and China may accelerate, beginning with President Xi Jinping’s scheduled official visit to Washington on September 24.

The China-Russia Summit: What Was Added? May 19–20

Now, just five days after the China-U.S. summit, from May 19 to 20, President Putin visited Beijing, where a substantive one-day summit was held.

Regarding exchanges between the Chinese and Russian leaders, President Xi Jinping has made six official visits to Russia since his first official visit in 2013, while President Putin has made eight visits to China. On average, this means that an official visit takes place approximately once a year.

There is considerable scope for cooperation between Russia’s energy resources and China’s enormous energy market. The approximately $228.1 billion in bilateral trade in 2025, which symbolizes this relationship, was emphasized repeatedly at this summit as well.

While the U.S.-China summit demonstrated that tensions between the United States and China continue to cast a long shadow, the China-Russia summit that immediately followed was held at the best possible time to broadly demonstrate that relations between the two countries in Eurasia remain rock-solid. This was undoubtedly a positive development for both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

The Significance of the China-North Korea Summit: June 8–9

The third summit was the China-North Korea summit, held during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang from June 8 to 9.

North Korea’s position in Northeast Asia rose significantly following President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 and the signing of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty,” as well as North Korean soldiers’ participation in the war in Ukraine based on that treaty.

A notable manifestation of this was the treatment of General Secretary Kim Jong Un as the number-three leader, behind Putin and Xi Jinping, at the Victory Day parade commemorating the defeat of Germany in the Red Square on May 9, 2025.

Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang this time can be understood as China’s effort to strengthen its relationship with North Korea commensurate with its self-perception as the country that fought alongside North Korea in the Korean War and that has the greatest influence over North Korea.

V. What Should Be Japan’s Policy Under These Circumstances?

Now I come to the final, fifth issue: Japanese foreign policy.

Following the Abe administration, which established the longest period of stable government in the history of Japan’s constitutional government, the administrations of Suga, Kishida, and Ishiba all ended after relatively short periods, and Mrs. Sanae Takaichi became the prime minister in October 2025.

Overall, the Takaichi administration has adopted a pro-American, conservative agenda and has begun implementing its own policy direction. However, in a parliamentary response on November 7, Takaichi stated that “if a situation threatening Japan’s survival arises in the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, Japan could fight alongside the United States.” This provoked an angry reaction from China, and Japan-China relations remain, perhaps, at their worst since diplomatic relations were established through the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, with no clear prospect for improvement.

Under these circumstances, I would like to identify four challenges for Japan’s policy.

First, whether under a neoconservative president or under Trump 2026, if the United States continues to manage the world solely according to its own interests and ceases to provide the “public goods” that America has provided to the world in the past, Japan should place even greater emphasis than before on its relationships with its “neighbors who cannot be moved.”

The “neighbors who cannot be moved” that have actually been discussed in Japan in the past are China, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia.

Second, in substantive terms, Japan should act through diplomacy that absolutely prevents war from breaking out in East Asia. To achieve this, there is no alternative but to strike a balance between “deterrence and dialogue” and between “defense capabilities and diplomatic capabilities.”

This is different from a passive pacifism that simply says “we will not wage war.” It is necessary to strengthen defense capabilities to a reasonable extent for the purpose of self-defense, but such capabilities must, above all, be complemented by “diplomacy and dialogue.”

Third, the most important thing the Takaichi administration must accomplish in the immediate future is to normalize relations with China. I strongly urge the administration to exercise the greatest possible wisdom and take the greatest possible action to fill this gap in Japanese diplomacy.

Fourth, with regard to America, our ally “across the Pacific,” Japan should pursue careful diplomacy while keeping firmly in mind that “security exists for the sake of national interests,” and not the other way around.

On this point, I apologize for turning briefly to a personal matter, but there is something I would very much like to say to all of you.

My father, Fumihiko Togo, was responsible for negotiations on the revision of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan as Director of the Security Affairs Division under Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, he was Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau and was responsible for the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué at the time of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. He subsequently became Vice-Minister, then served as Ambassador to the United States, holding that position for most of President Carter’s time in office, before retiring from government service after returning to Japan.

Shortly after his retirement, in 1982, he published a memoir entitled Thirty Years of Japan-U.S. Diplomacy.

On page 9 of the preface, he wrote:

“Whenever I have had the opportunity to give lectures and the like, I have said that relations with the United States are the cornerstone of our diplomacy. But this does not mean that this position has simply been handed to us. Rather, making it the cornerstone is advantageous and strategically sound for our country.”

In other words, put simply, he was saying that “security exists for the sake of national interests,” not that “national interests exist for the sake of security.”

I believe these are profound words.

With that, I would like to conclude my remarks.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.